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Article

The Character of Jury Exclusion
Anna Offitt
INTRODUCTION
In American jury trials, cause challenges and peremptory strikes
can be used to excuse otherwise eligible jurors based on their previous encounters with, or experience-based impressions of, the criminal
justice system.' The legitimacy of this practice hinges on the view that

t Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; AB, Princeton University; MPhil, University of Cambridge; JD, Georgetown Law; PhD, Princeton University. I am grateful for commentary on this Article during its development from Lauren
Ouziel, Melanie Reid, and Lauren Johnson as part of an ABA and AALS Academy for
Justice Roundtable. I am also grateful for invaluable substantive feedback from Jeffrey
Bellin, Valerie Hans, Catherine Grosso, Nancy Marder, Shari Diamond, Nikolai Kovalev,
Krystia Reed, and Matthew Fox-among others at the Law & Society Association 2021
annual meeting. This Article is indebted to Kelly McKowen for support and insight.
Thank you, also, to Stephanie Owen and Lili McEntire for outstanding research assistance and to the George and Pedie Bramblett Endowed Faculty Research Fund of SMU
Law School.
1. For a discussion of the understudied phenomenon of cause-based juror exclusion, see Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause:Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 824 (2020), stating "the distorting effects of challenges
for cause extend to noncapital cases as well, wherever prospective jurors may harbor
conscientious scruples against particular enforcement practices or the criminalization
of certain conduct (e.g., drug offenses, nonviolent property offenses)." See also ANNA
OFFIT, THE IMAGINED JUROR: How HYPOTHETICAL JURORS INFLUENCE FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 88-93) (on file with author) (discussing how jurors' past contact with the legal system contributed to federal prosecutors' negative
perceptions of them); Elisabeth Semel, Dagen Downard, Emma Tolman, Anne Weis,
Danielle Craig, & Chelsea Hanlock, Whitewashing the Jury Box: How CaliforniaPerpetuates the Exclusion of Black and Latinx Jurors, BERKELEY L. DEATH PENALTY CLINIC, at vi
(2020),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
Whitewashing-the-Jury-Box.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ8B-5P7P] (finding that racial
disparities can arise among empaneled jurors when "[p]rosecutors are trained to
strike prospective jurors who have had or whose relatives have had a negative experience with law enforcement or are distrustful of the criminal legal system. They are, in
other words, instructed to exploit the historic and present-day differential treatment
of Whites and people of color, especially African Americans and Latinx people, by the
police, prosecutors, and the courts").
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these individuals cannot fairly and impartially serve as jurors.2 Yet
this view lacks an empirical basis that would substantiate the connection between past contact with the legal system and a prospective juror's ability to assess evidence in the case before her. 3 Rather, it is a
widely accepted aspect of everyday legal practice that follows from
implicit assumptions shared by judges and lawyers about the effect of
the legal system on the character and integrity of the public. 4 Here, the
bias of legal actors is marshaled to protect the jury from the alleged
bias of prospective jurors.

While legal practitioners and scholars agree that character judgments should not be permitted to influence jurors' perceptions of witnesses,5 there is no such consensus about lawyers' and judges' character judgments of jurors.6 This is particularly surprising at a time
when empirical jury scholarship draws attention to the routinized and
largely uncontroversial ways in which everyday practices of empanelment lead to juries that are disproportionately white and affluent.7
Moreover, scholars have come to appreciate that lawyers are not the
only source of exclusionary behavior during jury selection-or "voir
dire." Judges too, typically through the use of cause challenges, perpetuate practices that entrench socio-economic and racial disparities. 8 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court 9 and American media' 0 have highlighted
2. Frampton, supra note 1, at 788-90.
3. See James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There EmpiricalSupportforExcluding Convicted Felonsfrom Jury Service?, 36 LAW & POL'Y 1, 1719 (2014) for a pertinent discussion of the unfounded assumption-and resultant
cost-of assuming that convicted felons will harbor pro-defense, pre-trial bias during
jury selection.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See generally Anna Offit, Benevolent Exclusion, 96 WASH. L. REV. 613 (2021).
8. See Ronald F. Wright, Kami Chavis & Gregory S. Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project:JurySelection Data as a PoliticalIssue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1426-28; Frampton, supra note 1, at 796-97 (citing the racial composition of Mississippi jury pools
between 1992 and 2017, the author found that a majority of the cause challenges initiated by the trial court judge removed Black prospective jurors: "Although white jurors outnumbered black jurors by nearly two to one in the initial jury pools, 52.9% of
the judge-proposed disqualifications were black jurors and 44.2% were white jurors").
9. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019) ("Equal justice under law
requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process ....
By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.").
10. In 2019, an investigative podcast covering the Curtis Flowers case was the
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the role that jury exclusion plays in eroding confidence in the legal
system.

Addressing these issues in the law and literature, this Article proposes the use of a new trial objection during jury selection, building
on the principles of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) which prohibits
reliance on prejudicial character assumptions." Applied to the jury

selection process, restrictions on character judgment would prevent
the exercise of cause challenges that deny otherwise eligible jurors the
right to participate in the legal system. Significantly, and relatedly, this
reform invites a fundamental rethinking of how jury exclusion operates beyond the more widely recognized and critiqued exercise of peremptory strikes.

I. CHARACTER EVIDENCE ON TRIAL
At the heart of the criminal legal system is an incontrovertible
and uncomfortable truth: we judge each others' character. And we do
so continually-from branding dishonest politicians as "liars"1 2 to
designating those convicted of crimes as "criminals."1 3 In each case,
the impulse is to make sense of the actions of strangers by linking
them with immutable personality traits. This instinct is no less salient
during criminal jury selection proceedings, where defense attorneys
probe the likelihood that jurors' negative opinions of defendants' alleged conduct might translate to broader condemnation of their character.14
first recipient of the George Polk Award in Podcast Reporting. Madeleine Baran, In the
Dark: Season Two, APM REPS., https://features.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/season
-two [https://perma.cc/AWA6-8CZS]; Past George Polk Award Winners, LONG ISLAND
UNIV.,
https://iu.edu/polk-awards/past-winners#2019
[https://perma.cc/N3LK
-X75E].
11. See infra Part III.
12. TOM DE LUCA & JOHN BUELL, LIARS! CHEATERS! EVILDOERS! DEMONIZATION AND THE
END OF CIVIL DEBATE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (2005) ("Character becomes important
not only for its own sake, or for completion of duties, but because it becomes evidence
of the good or evil, normalcy or deviance, of policies promoted by a particular character.").
13.

MIKE REDMAYNE, CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 196 (2015)

("When bad character evidence is introduced as evidence of a defendant's lack of credibility, it will almost always involve previous convictions. A key assumption, then, is
that there is a connection between criminality-or certain types of criminality-and
credibility.").
14. Under questioning by defense counsel in the prosecution of Derek Chauvin
for the murder of George Floyd, one prospective juror was asked to comment on how
one might go about resolving a dispute in the absence of "hard" (i.e., video) evidence.
Washington Post, Jury Selection Begins in Murder Trial for Derek Chauvin, YOUTUBE
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No area of the law addresses this tendency more fully than the
rules of evidence. These rules build on more than a century of common
law and seek to prevent jurors from replacing deliberation about
charged offenses with conclusory impressions of the accused or witnesses.'s In so doing, the Federal Rules of Evidence try to keep jurors
from hearing character evidence that might precipitate the unfounded
inference that a defendant's past unlawful act(s) should lead to the
presumption of guilt in an unrelated case.16
Though largely neglected with respect to jury selection, character
judgment has been a significant focus of advocacy and scholarship
about the criminal trial.1 7 This interest led in 1975 to Federal Rule of
Evidence 404's codification of the common law rule, which banned using evidence of character to prove that a person's act on a particular
occasion reflected a corresponding character trait.1 8 Character evidence is sometimes referred to as "propensity evidence," signaling the
potential for a juror to draw a shorthand connection between the presumed character trait of an individual and the assumption that person
will therefore "act a certain way" as the basis of a prosecution.1 9 Rule
404(b) further clarifies that evidence of a "crime, wrong, or other act"

3:53:18 (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhmcBiSF6Y [hereinafter Chauvin Jury Selection]. The prospective juror's response illustrates the commonsense perception that a person's credibility is a function of her perceived character. The prospective juror responded, in pertinent part:
It does get more difficult when there's no evidence and you're just kind of
taking the good word of somebody. I guess character comes into play. And if
you have any previous experience with that person, you know, there's that
old saying a spade's a spade, you know. If a guy's a liar he lies ten out of ten
times. You know, he might just lie to you again and you'd be naive to think
otherwise, I think.
Id.
15. See Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failureto See the FederalRules
of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1567
(1999) ("Federal Rules of Evidence readily can be seen as the product of the continuing
codification movement in the United States."); FED. R. EVID. 102 (advancing rules and
procedures aimed at helping jurors fairly and efficiently "ascertain[] the truth and secur[e] a just determination").
16. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404.
17. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes (citing legal scholarship regarding the use of character evidence).
18. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (1); Andrew J. Morris, FederalRule of Evidence 404(b): The
Fictitious Ban on CharacterReasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181,
181-82 (1998) (citing Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence:
FederalRule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 592-94 (1985)).
19. Dent Gitchel, The Admissibility (and Inadmissibility)of CharacterEvidence, 47
ARK. LAW 10, 10 (2012).
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is not admissible at trial to prove conduct in conformity with any character trait that is presumed on the basis of such evidence.20
A.

PROHIBITED USES OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

The Federal Rules' restriction on character evidence, under Rule
404, is commonly invoked at trial when prosecutors attempt to introduce a defendant's other unsavory acts. 21 This stands to reason. Legal
scholars have long recognized that the admission of evidence of past
wrongdoing on the part of an accused person poses a significant challenge for criminal prosecutions. 22 In fact, a prosecutor's 23 prejudicial
use of character propensity evidence is one of the main bases for criminal appeals and reversals. 24 Further, the Advisory Committee has
acknowledged that Rule 404(b) is among the most cited evidentiary
rules. 25
With respect to a defendant's "other acts," Rule 404(b)(1) stipulates that evidence cannot be admitted if its aim is to prove the existence of a character trait that accounted for a person's actions. 26 Attorneys can nonetheless successfully admit such character evidence as
proof of a "proper" purpose-including a person's motivation, opportunity, or plan to act in some way. 27 Even permissible openings for

&

20. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
21. Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, CharacterAssassination:Amending Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) to ProtectCriminalDefendants, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 771-72
(2018).
22. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct: One of the Most Misunderstood Issues in CriminalEvidence, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1986, at 6, 7.
23. Jessica Broderick, Reverse 404(b) Evidence: Exploring StandardsWhen Defendants Want to Introduce Other Bad Acts of Third Parties, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 587, 590
(2008) ("Although FRE 404(b) applies in both civil and criminal cases, it is most commonly invoked by prosecutors in criminal cases wishing to offer evidence of the defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts."); see FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's
notes to the 1991 amendment. Contra United States v. McClure, 546 F.2d 670, 672-73
(5th Cir. 1977) (using such extrinsic acts of an informant against the government in
entrapment defense).
24. Nancy Bauer, People v. Spoto: Teasing the Defense on PriorBad Acts Evidence,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 783, 790 (1992) (citing 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 404(08) (1991) (observing how Rule 404(b) is the most commonly litigated rule of evidence as reflected in reported decisions)).
25. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory's committee's notes to 1991 amendment; Capra
Richter, supra note 21, at 771.
26. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
27. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (The rule specifies "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident" as proper
purposes); see discussion infra note 201.
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character evidence are susceptible to abuse, 28 as they sidestep the rule
in a way that can work to a defendant's disadvantage. 29
In practice, a court faced with a 404(b) objection typically moves
through a three-step process: the court (1) highlights that Rule 404(b)
is "a rule of 'inclusion' and not exclusion"; (2) decides that the other
immoral act of the defendant fits into at least one "noncharacter purpose"; and (3) "declare[s] summarily that the probative value for the
proper purpose is not 'substantially outweighed' by unspecified prejudicial effect to the defendant."30 If admitted, previous acts of a defendant, illegal or not, may have the effect of introducing the pernicious inference that because the accused committed one immoral act,
she therefore has the characterof someone who would commit other
immoral acts-and, in all likelihood, the illegal act for which she
stands trial. 31
Though character judgment is a mainstay of everyday social interactions and decision-making, 32 the Federal Rules recognize that
such judgment for criminal defendants is dangerous. In particular, the
rules acknowledge that those accused of crimes are vulnerable to condemnation based on flawed assumptions about unalterable character
traits, rather than evidence that directly links them to the wrongdoing
for which they have been indicted. 33 It is precisely this prejudicial
mode of conflating crime with the character of a defendant that has
been subject to criticism by legal scholars, who have described it as
race-neutral in theory but racist in practice. 34 Rationales for Rule 404
thus emphasize the fact that character evidence is overly persuasive,
prompting jurors to "prejudge one with a bad general record and deny

28. Capra & Richter, supra note 21, at 831 (arguing that such "proper purposes
. . allow[] past misdeeds of criminal defendants to come before juries on a routine basis" with a "devastating effect . . on juries [that] is well-documented").
29. Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 7-8 (citing studies conducted by the Chicago
Jury Project and the London School of Economics and noting that such exceptions provide a workaround in the rules of evidence that can be viewed as an end-run favorable
to prosecutors that can "easily tip the balance against the defendant").
30. Capra & Richter, supra note 21, at 778.
31. Gitchel, supra note 19, at 10.
32. Id. ("We use our assessment of other people's character routinely in our daily
lives when making such decisions as whether to eat in a person's restaurant, enter into
a business transaction with him, or let him extract one of our teeth.").
33. Id.
34.

See generally NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE

IN AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016) (examining how judges, defense lawyers,
and prosecutors in Chicago's Cook County criminal courts transform race-neutral due
process protections into tools of racial punishment).
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him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge." 35 It is
thought to be too distracting to be admitted for its only "slight probative value." 36 The trouble, in other words, with behavioral evidence of
bad acts is that it falsely presumes character is static. 37 Despite research revealing that character poorly predicts behavior 38 and notwithstanding limiting instructions 39 and warnings by judges, laypeople-including jurors-inflate its importance at trial. 40
It is peculiar that scholars of character evidence have largely ignored the jury selection process, where propensity inferences are in

full force. In voir dire, there is little to prevent attorneys from urging
the excusal of lay decision-makers-ostensibly peers of such defendants-on the basis of their own unrelated "acts," whether illegal or
not.41 The grounds for such dismissals are wide-ranging, encompassing such information as jurors' neighborhoods, family, household
members, and presumed attitudes based on prior encounters with law
enforcement. 4 2
B.

LIMITATIONS OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404

Scholarship on Rule 404(b) has also targeted its discrepancies.
First, there is no clear definition of "character," resulting in blurred
conceptions of its limits. 43 The rule is also not uniformly applied
35. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
36. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes; Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing
Character:A New Perspective on CharacterEvidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1919 (2012)
("Moreover, recent psychological research suggests that character is, in reality, a much
weaker predictor of a person's conduct than was previously supposed.").
37. Morris, supra note 18, at 208.
38. Contra Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibitionby Upholding a Non-CharacterTheory of Logical Relevance,
the Doctrineof Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419,423 (2006) ("New psychological studies
suggest that a person's highly particularized character traits are more predictive of
conduct than was originally thought.").
39. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
40. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1933 (noting that "laypeople still commonly believe that character is highly predictive" despite evidence to the contrary). This phenomenon is referred to as the "halo effect" or "fundamental attribution error." Id. at
1934.
41. See infra Part II.
42. See, e.g., Confidential Juror Questionnaire, OFF. JURY COMM'R COMMONWEALTH,
https://juryduty.majury.gov/ojcweb/public/docs/CJQ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZV92
-NF26] (including a section titled "Your Experience with the Law," containing checkboxes pertaining to a prospective juror's past experiences being arrested, being
charged with a crime, or being the victim of a crime); see also OFFIT, supra note 1.
43. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character:The Personaland the Political,20 LOY. U.
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across cases. 44 In addition, more recent rules such as the rape shield 45
and those applicable to defendants accused of sex crimes 46 have expanded and contracted the rule to different ends. Indeed, the rule is
malleable and complex-a fact that helps explain why it has been generative of criminal justice reform.4 7
1. Vagueness: The Federal Rules Fail to Specify What Constitutes
Character Evidence
Though the Federal Rules ban most character evidence, they do
not actually specify what character evidence is.48 Courts therefore
continue to grapple with whether addictions, intellectual disabilities,
and sexuality can be understood as traits that should be covered by
character evidence rules. 49 Empirical scholarship has also transformed psychologists' views of character traits' consistency, as the
field has embraced "interactionism," which draws on earlier schools
of thought-including trait theory and situationism-to make sense
of character's defining and shifting features50 by drawing on contextual information. 5' From this perspective, character is often understood, as a predisposition to behave in a certain way in a particular
social and culturalcontext.

CHI. L.J. 1, 9 (1988) ("Existing definitions of character are circular, conclusory, or
both.").
44. Lisa Marshall, The CharacterofDiscriminationLaw: The IncompatibilityofRule
404 and Employment DiscriminationSuits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (2005) (discussing
the judiciary's failure to abide by Rule 404's character evidence ban in the context of
employment discrimination cases).
45. FED. R. EVID. 412.
46. FED. R. EVID. 413-15.
47. David P. Leonard, The PerilousTask of Rethinking the CharacterEvidence Ban,
49 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 835 (1998) (noting that the character evidence rules' "complexity
is legendary, their origins obscure, and their rationales controversial").
48. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1914. The advisory committee's notes to FRE 405
indirectly define character as "the kind of person one is." FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory
committee's notes. Anderson supports a two-fold definition of character: repeated behaviors or propensity, and morality. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1936-45.
49. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1919-20, 1924 (questioning whether "a proclivity for drinking alcohol [is] a trait of character (i.e., temperance) or a genetic disease
(i.e., alcoholism)").
50. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the "Grotesque"Doctrineof CharacterEvidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent PsychologicalResearch, 36 Sw. U. L.
REV. 741, 754 (2008).
51. Id. at 758 ("[A] situational component must be factored into, included in, or
incorporated into the very conception of a disposition or character trait."); Imwinkel-
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The interpretation of evidence-including character evidenceis also contextual. Legal scholar Julia Simon-Kerr, for example, has argued that narrative coherence can lead one to assess strangers' character in ways that conform to normative expectations of how a reliable
person should look and comport herself-even if informed by stereotypes.5 2

2. Inconsistency: Application of the Federal Rules Is Irregular and
Therefore Fails to Remove All Problematic Character Evidence from
Trials
The ambiguity of "character" and "character evidence" likely accounts for the haphazard application of Rule 404.s3 Though the Rule
was designed to create a "blanket exclusion"5 4 for most character evidence, trials are replete with indicia of character that our adversarial
system readily exploits,55 sometimes through Rule 404(b)(2).56 Its
critics have thus argued that the rule is confused and not used in a

ried, supra note 38, at 450-51 ("To be sure, a person's genetic background, environment, and characteristics influence a person's behavior. However, consistent with
Western philosophic tradition, for the most part American law assumes that persons
are autonomous human beings possessed of volitional capacity.").
52. Julia Simon-Kerr, Uncovering Credibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
HUMANITIES 584, 587 (Simon Stern, Maksymilian Del Mar & Bernadette Meyler eds.,
2020) ("What bears emphasis, however, is that these credibility judgments, most particularly the ones we make of strangers, are constructed from observations that have
little to do with truthfulness. Instead, they are informed much more by social notions
about what types of people are reliable in particular situations and how reliable people
should look and act.").
53. D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus
Operandi and "OffenderProfiling":Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Sciencefor the Law
of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 206 (2002) ("The borderline between propensity
uses and non-propensity uses is ill-defined and indeterminate, and therefore the decision is heavily subject to non-doctrinal influences like the judge's idiosyncratic personal views and the skills of the lawyers at marshaling facts and engaging in rhetorically persuasive forensic argument.").
54. Marshall, supra note 44, at 1085. As a "blanket exclusion," it is supposed to
produce "less arbitrary results." Id.
55. Leonard, supra note 47, at 837 (noting that the legal system "tolerates-and
even encourages-attorneys to expose the jury to evidence of character through other
means").
56. Morris, supra note 18, at 184 ("Rule 404(b) itself accepts the conventional fallacy that certain common uses of bad acts evidence-to show identity, for instancedo not depend on propensity reasoning, and thus, do not run afoul of the propensity
ban .... [This] robs Rule 404(b) of any coherent purpose, and produces grave consequences for thousands of criminal and civil defendants.").
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principled manner.5 7
The inconsistent application of Rule 404 comes into particular relief in the context of employment discrimination claims. Here, a litigant's success depends on a clear violation of the rule.5 8 In this context, an employment discrimination claim requires proof that the
employer's motivation for action was discriminatory, which can only
be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence of the employer's prior
acts, such as "the employer's comments, her treatment of past employees, [and] statistical comparisons between employees."5 9 Under these
circumstances an employee hopes to show that "because the employer
has previously intended to discriminate, he [or she] is more likely to
intend to discriminate in the future," such as in the specific situation
litigated. 60 Another way to describe this type of proof is as a propensity inference.
Other character evidence enters the courtroom without formal
acknowledgment or sanctioned admission. Such "offstage" 6 1indices of
character include types of evidence like styles of dress, 62 demeanor, 63
and race 64-all of which precipitate immediate judgment in court
57. Gillian R. Chadwick, Reorienting the Rules of Evidence, 39 CARDOZO L. REV.
2115, 2159 (2018) (characterizing the rule as "illogically founded and inconsistently
applied"); see also Phillip W. Broadhead, Why Bias Is Never CollateralII: Necessary Limitations on Attempts to Rehabilitate Impeached Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 34 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 239, 253-55 (2010).
58. Marshall, supra note 44, at 1097 (noting that the lawyers and judges are all
complicit in this prohibited admission of propensity evidence because "the cause of
action itself requires a showing of mental state that effectively compels most plaintiffs
in discrimination suits to introduce propensity proofs in order to prevail").
59. Id. at 1068-69.
60. Id. at 1080; see also Morris, supra note 18, at 195 ("[T]here is no hypothesis
that renders such evidence relevant to alleged harassment or discrimination other
than that these types of evidence demonstrate the continuing propensities of the defendant.").
61. Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Kimberly M. Baker, Goffman on the
Jury: RealJurors'Attentionto the "Offstage" of Trials, 34 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 310, 310
(2010) (defining "offstage observation" as information on which jurors focus that has
not been "formally presented from the witness stand").
62. See Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 875,
879 (2018) ("[C]lothing itself is communicative .... We should be troubled by a justice
system where guilt or innocence turns on whether a defendant can afford a proper suit,
or whether a law enforcement officer wears a uniform when he testifies, or whether
the defendant wears glasses, or how an attorney dresses.").
63. Id. at 881-82 (discussing aspects of demeanor evidence which circumvent the
Rules of Evidence).
64. Montr6 D. Carodine, "The Mis-Characterizationof the Negro": A Race Critique
of the PriorConviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 531 (2009) ("When a Black
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without scrutiny or contestation. 65 Jurors can in turn use this information to make character inferences and draw conclusions about the
parties and evidence before them. 66 Attorneys, who are not immune
to the effects of such tacit signals of character, are just as susceptible
to the incorporation of offstage information into their assessments of
prospective jurors. 67 In turn, these assessments can form the basis of
cause challenges (and peremptory strikes) used to justify the excusal
of otherwise jury-eligible laypeople. 68
Despite the erratic application and enforcement of Rule 404's
character prohibition, the prejudicial effect of such evidence would
seem to militate in favor of further limiting reliance on such information. 69 It would be a logical extension of the doctrine to apply the
rule's restrictions to other aspects of the trial, including the jury selection process. The rationale for doing so is already elaborated in the
justification for rape shield 70 laws-though these laws also fail to
completely prohibit the use of propensity evidence. 71

person is judged by the color of her skin, it is . . not the result of [the] careful weighing
of evidence .... ).
65. See Capers, supra note 62, at 868-71 (bringing attention to character evidence's unchecked entrance into the courtroom).
66. See Rose et al., supra note 61, at 317 (discussing conclusions about jurors that
are made using "offstage" evidence).
67. See Wright et al., supra note 8, at 1428 ("Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys . . . value different characteristics in jurors.").
68. See id. at 1412 (noting that there are "only a few ways" in which lawyers can
take their peremptory strikes too far-exclusion based on race, sex, and other protected characteristics); see also Will Craft, How Did CurtisFlowers End Up with a Nearly
All-White Jury?, APM REPS. (June 5, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-the
-dark/curtis-flowers-trial-six-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/H4SY-VCXD] (describing the demographic effect of jurors' removal through cause challenges during the
prosecution of Curtis Flowers).
69. But see Ted Sampsell-Jones, Implicit Stereotyping as Unfair Prejudice in Evidence Law, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 174, 188 (2017) ("Repealing Rule 404 could help
to convict more guilty white defendants and also help to acquit more innocent minority
defendants.").
70. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
71. Gillian R. Chadwick's article succinctly describes the key exceptions to the
character evidence ban: "(1) witness impeachment [FRE 608-09], (2) prior sex crimes
[FRE 413-15], (3) the so-called MIMIC exceptions [FRE 404(b)(2)], and (4) the mercy
rule [FRE 404(a) (2)]." Chadwick, supra note 57, at 2145.
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Rape Shield and Sex Crime Exceptions

Rule 412's rape shield bars the introduction of the sexual history
of victims.72 At the same time, Rules 413, 414, and 415 allow for evidence of a defendant's previous sex crimes to be admitted.73 To make
sense of why propensity evidence is banned for one group and not for
another, it helps to look at the probative value of the evidence involved. 74 The sexual history of a complainant in a rape prosecution,
for example, will offer little indication of whether she suffered the misfortune, on a particular occasion, of having been the victim of a sex
crime. 75 The rape shield 76 can thus be understood as a more particularized application of Rule 404's character ban, justified by its alignment with the accuracy-enhancing interest of cutting off lines of questioning that put the victim, rather than the defendant, on trial. 77 The
traditional practice of scrutinizing a victim's sexual history in a rape
trial to infer promiscuity not only hinders the reporting of such crimes
but also reduces the likelihood of conviction. 78
Still, jurors' appetites for character judgment lead to the pervasive scrutiny of victims' appearances and manner of relaying details
about alleged incidents in court.79 Moreover, research suggests that
jurors rely on traditional gender stereotypes in deciding cases, thus
disregarding rules, including 412, and any limiting instructions on the

72. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
73. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensityand Probabilityin Sex Offense Cases
and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 23 (1994) ("If the victim has immunity from
disclosure of what she has done in the past, the argument runs, then why should the
defendant be taxed with his past misconduct?"); Morris, supra note 18, at 196 n.58 (explaining that evidence of a defendant's past sex offenses are admissible "without limitation on purposes").
74. See Karp, supra note 73, at 24 (stating that a defendant's history of committing
sexual assaults is "likely to be highly probative in relation to the pending charge").
75. Id.
76. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (barring any "(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim
engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual
predisposition" save for 412(b)'s listed exceptions).
77. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution:Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant'sPastSexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 716
(1995) (noting the potential for inquiries into the complainant's sexual history to distract the jury from the real facts at issue).
78. Roger C. Park, Characterat the Crossroads,49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 748 (1998);
Gregory M. Matoesian, Language, Law, and Society: Policy Implications of the Kennedy
Smith Rape Trial, 29 LAw & Soc' REV. 669, 670 (1995).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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use of certain evidence. 80 For these reasons, the rape shield may not
greatly improve the experience of victims. 81
In contrast to rape shield laws, Rules 413-15 allow for the admission of evidence pertaining to similar crimes in sexual assault cases. 82
These rules also arose to promote justice. 83 Among the aims of such
rules was the protection of victims who were subject to crimes committed in secret-that is, with few (or no) witnesses. 84 Another rationale hinged on the idea that someone with a past rape or child molestation conviction was likely to have "aggressive and sexual
impulses," as well as the inability or lack of desire to control them. 85
Further, though these crimes in general have comparatively low rates
of recidivism, 86 research examining defendants in sex offense prosecutions over longer time frames reveals a higher rate of repeat offenses. 87

&

80. Matoesian, supra note 78, at 672-73. See generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose,
UnfinishedBusiness in Rape Law Reform, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 173 (1992) (arguing for a trialprocess focus for rape law reform).
81. Matoesian, supra note 78, at 688-89. Moreover, its failure can be traced back
to the fact that the rape shield "was not designed to cover so much mundane cultural
ground," like "the interactionally emergent derivation of covert inferences emanating
from the patriarchal logic of sexual rationality." Id. at 691.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. See Deborah L. Rhode, Characterin CriminalJustice Proceedings:Rethinking
Its Role in Rules GoverningEvidence, Punishment, Prosecutors,and Parole, 45 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 353, 361 (2019) (classifying these rules as a reaction to landmark "cases of seeming
injustice").
84. Karp, supra note 73, at 20. This rationalization, however, can make it difficult
to know where to draw the line for crimes in which character evidence is authorized.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 447 (arguing that character evidence has become
"vital" not only in child abuse cases and civil rights actions, but also in drug prosecutions). Because sexual assaults are the only violent crime where consent is a valid defense (so past sexual assaults are crucial to the plausibility of its occurrence on the
charged occasion), scholars have argued that these crimes distinctively warrant an exception to the propensity ban. Karp, supra note 73, at 21.
85. Karp, supra note 73, at 20.
86. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "OtherCrimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 572 (1994) (reporting a 7.7% rate of recidivism for rape in a 1989
Bureau of Justice Statistics study).
87. Rhode, supra note 83, at 362; see also Marnie E. Rice, Vernon L. Quinsey,
Grant T. Harris, Sexual Recidivism Among Child Molesters Releasedfrom a Maximum Security PsychiatricInstitution, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 381, 381-83 (1991)
(finding that nearly one-third of "child molesters" reoffended within six years of their
release from a psychiatric institution).
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Critics, in turn, have raised due process concerns and questioned
the obliteration of the presumption of innocence for such defendants. 88 They also worry that jurors will convict defendants based on
their previous offenses rather than any evidence in the case on trial. 89
Indeed, the inflexibility of Rules 413, 414, and 415 may effectively require the introduction of unfounded and prejudicial categorization
and character judgment of an accused individual. 90
Thus, we see that while rape shield laws provide a model for the
extension of character propensity evidence prohibitions, they exist in
practice alongside the exceptions of Rules 413-415. There is an argument to be made for this discrepancy: banning character propensity
evidence pertaining to victims keeps them from effectively being put
on trial, while allowing it for defendants helps prosecutors overcome
the evidentiary difficulties associated with these cases. 91 Nevertheless, whatever its justifications here, the admission of character propensity evidence is, as always, very risky, and it creates the possibility
that a person will be judged for something entirely unrelated to the
case at hand.92 While we may accept these risks for the prosecution of
certain crimes, there is no convincing argument for their presence in
the jury selection process, where they only serve to exclude people
with previous contact with the legal system or a well-founded and critical understanding of the limitations of that system.93
II. BASES OF JUROR CHARACTER JUDGMENT
During the jury selection process, judges and lawyers often articulate concerns about juror bias based on perceptions of acts and experiences that are wholly unrelated to the proceedings for which laypeople have been summoned. For this reason, determinations of a
prospective juror's ability to serve fairly and impartially are suscepti-

ble to spurious assumptions about how that juror's stated opinions
and experiences might affect her impartiality in approaching different
case-types. This can result in otherwise eligible laypeople being struck
from jury pools for cause or, later, through use of peremptory

88. Mark A. Sheft, FederalRule of Evidence 413: A DangerousNew Frontier, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 57, 77 (1995).
89. Karp, supra note 73, at 22.
90. See id. ("Rather, the 'prejudice' rationale maintains that this type of evidence
carries an unacceptable risk of convicting the innocent.").
91. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
93. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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strikes. 94
Considering these risks, it is fair to scrutinize judges' excusals of
jurors for cause. Though propensity inferences can be useful with respect to certain decision-making processes, 95 judges' and attorneys' 96
reliance on them to identify 97 jurors'prejudicial tendencies can narrow jury pools in arbitrary and unfair ways. 98 In an effort to empanel
a jury committed to correctly discerning facts in the case at hand, for
example, judges may dismiss those who indicate that they would be
disinclined to trust a witness who was also a law enforcement agent.

94. See discussion infra Part III.
95. See, e.g., Gitchel, supra note 19 (acknowledging the prevalence of character
assessments in everyday life).
96. Differences between jury selection proceedings that are led by attorneys, as
opposed to judges, may affect the depth, length, and specificity of questioning-and, in
turn, whether the questions provide sufficient opportunity to uncover jurors' biases.
See Barry P. Goode, Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity: The Range and Limits of Voir
Dire, 92 KY. L.J. 601, 695 (2004) (indicating that brief questioning by a judge may not
lead a juror to think that their biases have been exposed); David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales,
Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 252
(1981) (noting a study showing that judge-conducted jury selection resulted in significant time savings).
97. One means of gathering information about sources of juror bias is through
juror questionnaires. See Cathy E. Bennett, Robert B. Hirschhorn & Heather R. Epstein,
How to Conduct a Meaningful and Effective Voir Dire in CriminalCases, 46 SMU L. REV.
659, 662 (1992) (expounding on questions to include in juror questionnaires). Jury
questionnaires maybe beneficial because they can be completed in advance while freeing prospective jurors from the pressure and constraints of having to respond to questions in the courtroom. See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People
with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir DireProcess injury Selection, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1179, 1186-87 (2003) (providing an example in which jurors were hesitant to speak up in front of other jurors and only revealed disqualifying information
when questioned individually). Contra Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires;
(Ab)using jurors,40 CONN. L. REV. 1, 20,39 (2007) (noting problems with jury questionnaires, such as the cost to both the jurors and the court, the limitations of intrusive
and/or generically worded questions, and the inaccuracies attendant to jurors' presentations of themselves, (e.g., "[a]n individual may see himself or herself as a leader but
an attorney may see that person quite differently")).
To the extent that a judge does not approve the distribution of a written jury questionnaire, research suggests the importance of facilitating a "a real and honest relationship or dialogue," with prospective jurors. Bennett et al., supra, at 665. The goal is
to "create an environment in which [jurors] feel it is acceptable and even valued to
admit biases." Id. at 675.
98. While narrowing down the jury pool and moving more quickly through the
trial are worthy aims, both the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause provide another reason that attorneys should aim to keep propensity evidence out of their jury
selection strategy: defendants have a constitutional right to an unbiased jury. U.S.
CONST. amends. VI, XIV, § 1; Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminatingthe Verdict: The Problem ofjuror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 334 (2005).
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And, to be sure, some jurors report that they hold beliefs-resulting
from media consumption or common sense-that police should be
taken at their word. 99 Still, the dismissal of skeptical jurors is likely to
reinforce racial disparities.1 00
Attorneys may also deliberately and strategically question jurors
for the purpose of unearthing overt and problematic biases, such as
prejudicial attitudes about race, religion, or gender identity.101 Routine subjects of jury selection questioning may thus appear to lawyers

in the run of cases as justifiable reliance on propensity evidence aimed
at "exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of
potential jurors,"1 02 regardless of the effect of such questioning on jurors' responses.1 03
A.

NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS

This section discusses patterns of jury exclusion associated with
dismissing people who hold negative views of law enforcement
agents. Such perceptions are often based on a prospective juror's

acknowledgement of systemic racism in, or previous personal contact
with, the legal system.
1.

Acknowledgment of Systemic Racism Within the Legal System
Prospective jurors may be dismissed from jury service using

cause challenges and peremptory strikes based on their experience
with, or recognition of, racism as a feature of the legal system.1 04 And
99. See Anna Offit, Peer Review: Navigating Uncertainty in the United States Jury
System, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 169, 176 (2016) ("The use of juror-types was complicated
by cases in which jurors implied that they trusted law enforcement agents implicitly.").
100. See Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington & Shea Cronin,Juror Perceptionsof the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 773, 777 (2013) ("[M]inority groups hold less favorable attitudes toward legal
authorities generally.").
101. See Anna Offit, Race-ConsciousJury Selection, 82 OHIo ST. L.J. 201, 236 (2021)
(noting how some prosecutors' questioning of prospective jurors about sources of racial bias could benefit them as practitioners of color in a predominantly white federal
bar).
102. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984);
Gershman, supra note 98, at 349 ("The voir dire process is intended to expose juror
biases based on a juror's attitudes toward such questions as race, ethnicity, religion,
the media, law enforcement, the death penalty, and other subjects.").
103. See Bennett et al., supra note 97, at 666 (explaining that responses-in any
form of communication-are affected by the "form and content of the statement or
question").
104. See Hans & Jehle, supra note 97, at 1180 (stating that juror experiences and
attitudes are prime factors in shaping perceptions of evidence).
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this occurs despite the empirical reality that Black citizens face disparate treatment at the hands of law enforcement agents' 0 5-experiences that have no relation to the prosecution for which such a juror
might be empaneled. The unregulated and arbitrary nature of juror
excusal undermines the representativeness of lay participation in the
American legal system.1 06 Indeed, it prompts difficult questions: How
should judges and lawyers approach the task of empaneling a jury in
a justice system rife with injustice?1 07 And what demographic disparities are reinforced by the insistence that citizens have no knowledge
of-or experience with-the excesses and abuses of the criminal legal
system in practice?

The jury selection process during the prosecution of Derek
Chauvin offered an instructive example of how knowledge of prejudice on the part of law enforcement agents can eventually lead to a
prospective juror's excusal-if not precipitate such an excusal directly.1 08 In that case, prospective jurors were asked a series of ques-

tions that required them to express the extent of their agreement with
propositions related to the fairness of the criminal justice system and
treatment of people of color by police officers.1 09
105. Offit, supra note 101, at 243.
106. See id. at 208 (commenting on the discretion afforded both judges and attorneys when excusing jurors).
107. See Katherine Culver, Courting Legitimacy: Enregistering Legal Reasoning
Among U.S. Criminal TrialJurors,5 SIGNS & Soc'Y 1, 25 (2017) for an illustrative case in
which a former juror who believed the criminal legal system was "stacked against
young black males" omitted reference to this belief during jury selection and later deliberations, commenting to the author during an interview:
I didn't let my feeling get involved, if I had let my feeling got [sic] involved . .
I know I could have convinced them not to convict this young man ... 'cause
I, when I first was questioned by the judge, and she asked could I be a fair and
impartial juror, I said yes, and I try not to lie, I don't lie, so when I told her yes
then I felt that I had to go in that jury room and be impartial to either side.
108. The Hennepin County residents who reported for jury service in the prosecution of former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin for the killing of George Floyd
were asked to complete a sixteen-page questionnaire that included sixty-nine questions, including several with sub-parts. Special Juror Questionnaire, HENNEPIN CNTY.
DIST. CT. (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/
High-Profile-Cases/27-CR-20-12646/JurorQuestionnaire12222020.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Q8ET-6GPV]; see also Sonali Chakravarti, Derek Chauvin and the Myth of the
Impartial Juror, BOS. REV. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.bostonreview.net/
articles/sonali-chakravarti-blm-jury-tk [https://perma.cc/57UQ-NWAH] ("A potential juror mentioning the documented unequal pattern of racial violence at the hands
of police should not automatically lead to their dismissal.").
109. SpecialJuror Questionnaire,supra note 108. This portion of the questionnaire
included twelve sub-questions which generally probed prospective jurors' opinions
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Figure 1: Chauvin Jury Selection Questionnaire"10
Please circle the choice that reflects your honest opinion:
Strongly

Somewhat

No Opinion

Somewhat
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Disagree

a.

Discrimination is not as bad as the media
makes it out to be.

1

2

3

4

S

b.

Blacks and other minorities do not receive

1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

equal treatment as whites in the criminal
justice system
c.

Police in this country treat whites and blacks
equally.

1

2

d.

Police in my community make me feel safe.

1

2

3

4

5

e.

I support defunding the Minneapolis

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Police

Department.
f.

g.

Minneapolis police officers are more likely to
respond with force when confronting black
suspects than when dealing with white suspects.

Because

law enforcement officers have such
dangerous jobs, it is not right to second guess

4

decisions they make while on duty.

h

racial
The criminal just system is biased against
and ethnic minorities.

1

4

I

I do not trust the police.

1

2

3

4

j.

People today do not give our law enforcement
officers the respect they deserve.

1

2

3

4

k.

Local police departments try to cover up
excessive force rather than correct it.

1

2

3

4

L.

I think that news reports about police brutality
against racial minorities is only the tip of the

1

3

4

iceberg.

At one point during the proceedings, an anonymous prospective

juror was asked to explain why he noted strong agreement that the
criminal justice system was biased against racial and ethnic minorities."' He responded, "At the time that I had done that questionnaire
I knew, or I do know now, about, you know, mandatory minimums and
things like that that are biased against racial minorities, statistically,"
before clarifying that this knowledge predated his jury summons.112
Others shared similar understandings of disparate policing practices,
including a prospective juror who defense counsel dismissed using a

about systemic bias, including excessive use of force by the Minneapolis Police Department and other law enforcement agencies. Id.
110. Id.
111. Chauvin Jury Selection, supra note 14, at 2:46:20.
112. Id.
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peremptory strike on the grounds that he "expressed strong opinions"11 3 despite the juror's repeated assertion that he was willing to
set such opinions aside if empaneled.11 4 This was not the only prospective juror who recounted negative personal experiences with the
Minneapolis Police Department. Another noted that his father had
been subject to a racially motivated traffic stop, contributing to his
own distrust and dim view of the city's law enforcement personnel.115
This trial is just one high-profile example of the broader phenomenon of juror exclusion based on critical impressions of law enforcement. The same issue was confronted head-on in a novel Massachusetts case in 2019, Commonwealth v. Williams, in which the defendant
appealed his conviction by citing a juror's dismissal from service for
cause after stating that the justice system is rigged against young
Black men.11 6 The same prospective juror noted that although this
view-rooted, as it was, in her work with low-income young peopleaffected "the lens that [she] view[ed] the world through," she could
impartially assess evidence in the present case.11 7 Though the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed that the prospective juror should not have been dismissed for cause on the basis of an accurate perception of a biased legal system,11 8 the conviction was not

113. Id. at 4:14:27 (showing that the dismissal of this prospective juror precipitated a Batson challenge by the prosecution since he was the second person of color
defense counsel sought to excuse using a peremptory strike).
114. Id. The government highlighted in its Batson challenge argument that defense
counsel chose not to strike a white prospective juror (#2) who shared a similar account
of a past aggressive encounter with law enforcement. Id. For a discussion of the comparative juror analysis deployed by the government in its argumentation, see generally
Offit, supra note 101, at 210-22. Although the judge ultimately denied the government's Batson challenge, he agreed that the dismissal of two Hispanic jurors satisfied
the Batson doctrine's requirement that a prima facie case of discrimination be established. ChauvinJury Selection, supra note 14, at 4:18:50.
115. See Chauvin Jury Selection supra note 14, at 7:21:10, where the prospective
juror expressed his beliefs that the Minneapolis Police Department has a history of
corruption and that he feels intimidated in the presence of city police officers; see also
joy Purdy, PotentialJurorsin Ahmaud Arbery Case Face QuestionsAbout Race, NEws4JAx
(Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2021/10/19/Jacksonville
-attorney-examines-questions-asked-to-potential-j urors-in-ahmaud-arbery-case
[https://perma.cc/6D6Y-8X3M] (reporting that prospective jurors summoned for the
high-profile prosecutions of the three men charged with killing Ahmaud Arbery in
Glynn County, Georgia, were asked to register their agreement with the statement
"[p] olice in this country do not treat Black and white people equally").
116. 116 N.E.3d 609, 612 (Mass. 2019).
117. Id. at 612-13.
118. Id. at 617 n.6 (citing extensive empirical data showing disparate treatment in
the criminal justice system on the basis of race).
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overturned.11 9 Significantly, however, the court stated that the prevailing norm in assessing proposed cause challenges should be altered
in subsequent cases-that is, a juror should not be expected to "set
aside an opinion born of the prospective juror's life experiences or belief system," though they ought to agree to set aside opinions related
to the case at hand.120
Similarly, in Mason v. United States,121 which reached the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in 2017, a prospective juror stated dur-

ing jury selection that she believed Black men in D.C. were treated unfairly by the criminal legal system.1 22 The trial court concluded that
her beliefs stemmed from her suspicion that racial profiling had influenced an out-of-state case against her brother.1 23 The trial court had
disqualified this prospective juror for cause on the basis of this perception despite its veracity.1 24 The D.C. Court of Appeals proceeded to
119. Id. at 622 ("[T]he defendant has not shown that the resulting dismissal of the
prospective juror for cause resulted in prejudice. We therefore decline to set aside the
verdict.").
120. Id. at 616. The court also expressed its conclusion:
that holding particular beliefs about how African-American men are treated
in the criminal justice system should not be automatically disqualifying ....
However, jury selection ultimately was incomplete because the judge did not
inquire further to determine whether, given the prospective juror's beliefs
based on her life experiences, she nevertheless could fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the law.
Id. at 613-14. Judge Peter A. Cahill instructed jurors along similar lines during jury
selection proceedings in the prosecution of Derek Chauvin by stating to one prospective juror:
You have to essentially be a blank slate. It's okay to come in with some
knowledge about the case. It's okay to even have opinions; It's even okay to
have strong opinions about the case. But as a juror you have to put all that
aside. Some people will say, 'I can't do that. I've got these very strong opinions; I cannot put them aside; I cannot be...' and very honestly they say they
can't be fair and impartial. Some people even with strong opinions can say, 'I
understand my role and actually I feel I have the self-discipline to be able to
do that-to put aside what I've heard before and decide just on what I hear
in court and to follow the law which obviously comes from the court.' Do you
think you could do that?
Chauvin Jury Selection, supra note 14, at 3:31:00.
121. 170 A.3d 182 (D.C. 2017).
122. Id. at 185.
123. Id.
124. Id. The court noted the data the defendant cited, which indicated that thirtyfive percent of all adults and sixty-eight percent of Black people believed that "blacks
are treated less fairly than whites in the courts." Id. (citing King's Dream Remains an
Elusive Goal; Many Americans See Racial Disparities, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2013),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2013/08/22/kings-dream-remains-
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find that the excusal of this prospective juror for cause was erroneous
because "[s]tanding alone, the belief that the criminal-justice system
is systemically unfair to blacks is not a basis to disqualify a juror."12 5
The juror's belief, in the court's view, was neither uncommon nor irrational.1 26
It is difficult to predict when, and whether, a prospective juror's
view that Black Americans are treated differently or unfairly by the
criminal legal system will be interpreted by judges as legitimate
grounds for excusal.1 27 In fact, more overt instances of biased opinions
have been viewed as acceptable. In two cases, Commonwealth v.
Long1 28 and Commonwealth v. Clark,129 potential jurors-who were
white-indicated that they had particular biases that were directly
relevant to the cases for which they could be empaneled. Yet they
could not say with confidence in either case that they would be able to
set those beliefs aside at trial.130 In these cases, neither juror was dismissed for cause.131
The lack of consistency associated with courts' willingness to excuse overtly prejudiced white prospective jurors for cause is a stark
reminder of the intransigence of racism. Perversely, it seems that for
jurors who have experienced discrimination or misconduct at the

an-elusive-goal-many-americans-see-racial-disparities
[https://perma.cc/V8MP
-YHC7]); see also John Gramlich, From Police to Parole, Black and White Americans Differ Widely in Their Views of CriminalJustice System, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 21, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/21/from-police-to-parole-black
-and-white-americans-differ-widely-in-their-views-of-criminal-j ustice-system
[https://perma.cc/JS4G-KPF2] ("[A] round nine-in-ten black adults (87%) said blacks
are generally treated less fairly by the criminal justice system than whites .....
125. Mason, 170 A.3d at 187.
126. See id. ("Moreover, there is no basis for an inference that potential jurors holding that belief are necessarily unable to be impartial. To the contrary, potential jurors
who hold that belief might well be particularly attentive to making sure that they perform their function impartially.").
127. See id. at 183-84 (finding a reversible error where the trial court dismissed a
potential juror for such views).
128. 647 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 1995) (finding reversible error where a judge did not
dismiss a biased juror for cause).
129. 846 N.E.2d 765, 768, 773-74 (Mass. 2006) (holding that the trial court judge
erred in declining to excuse for cause a juror who believed that "African-Americans as
a group were more likely to commit crimes because of their economic status than people of other racial or ethnic groups" where the juror's answers to the judge's questions
concerning those views were "not sufficient to resolve concerns about potential prejudice" to the defendant).
130. Long, 647 N.E.2d at 1165; Clark, 846 N.E.2d at 773.
131. Long, 647 N.E.2d at 1165; Clark, 846 N.E.2d at 765.
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hands of law enforcement agents, being kept in the jury box might require the explicit denial or repudiation of the factors-including racial
profiling-that may have led to these encounters. Unbiased jurors, in
other words, must deny the existence of a biased legal system-or face
exclusion.
Prospective jurors' skepticism of law enforcement is not surpris-

ing given the likelihood that poor and Black citizens will have personal
or second-hand experience with the misdemeanor legal process, as today more than twenty percent of the country's population have a
criminal record.1 32 Scholars have observed a similar phenomenon in
the course of researching how police both instigate and punish instances of "disorderly conduct" in communities of color.1 33 In this respect, police officers can provoke the very "contempt" that serves as
grounds for unfounded and disparate arrests.1 34 Negative opinions of
the legal system, as discussed in the sections that follow, are thus often
grounded in legitimate recognition of law enforcement agents' treatment of the most vulnerable and marginalized members of a community.

Over the past decade, the Black Lives Matter (BLM)13 5 movement
has gained momentum in North America and the United Kingdom in
response to police-inflicted violence against and harm of Black people.1 36 In light of the BLM's critique of law enforcement, it is unsurprising that the movement has emerged as a focus of jury selection
132. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS, at xxix (Tenth Anniversary ed. 2020) (noting that those with criminal

records are "overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately people of color").
133. See generally Christy E. Lopez, Disorderly (mis)Conduct: The Problem with
"Contempt of Cop" Arrests, AM. CONST. SOC. (2010), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts
.gov/datastore/library/2015/08/10/VelazquezContempt0fCop.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Z9GB-BXKN] (describing this phenomenon through the exemplary case of Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr., who was arrested for disorderly conduct by police responding to a 911 call reporting a burglary at Professor Gates' home).
134. Eric Nalder, Obstruction of Justice, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, February 28,
2009 (on file with Minnesota Law Review).
135. According to their website, BLM
is a global organization . . whose mission is to eradicate white supremacy
and build local power to intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities
by the state and vigilantes. By combating and countering acts of violence, creating space for Black imagination and innovation, and centering Black joy, we
are winning immediate improvements in our lives.
About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about [https://perma
.cc/G7FJ-PVAX].
136. See Jose A. Del Real, Robert Samuels & Tim Craig, How the Black Lives Matter
Movement Went Mainstream, WASH. POST (June 9, 2020), https://www
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questioning. Here again a puzzle emerges: citizens' identification with
non-violent activism aimed at promoting racial equality1 37 can result
in the prohibition of such individuals' participation in the legal system.
In People v. Silas,138 for example, an otherwise eligible prospective juror named Crishala Reed was the subject of multiple cause challenges due to prosecutors' beliefs that her support for the BLM movement signaled potential support of criminal activity.1 39 Though the
cause challenges were denied by the district court judge, they resulted
in Reed's dismissal from the jury pool through a peremptory strike.
Recognizing the misleading and inaccurate conclusions about jurors that can be drawn from such involvement, activists and practitioners have urged courts not to allow participation in BLM to lead to
dismissal from jury service.1 40 Using this type of civic engagement as
the only grounds for a juror's excusal can result in disparately subjecting Black prospective jurors to additional scrutiny.141 This has led
.washingtonpost.com/national/how-the-black-lives-matter-movement-went
-mainstream/2020/06/09/201bd6e6-a9c6-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html
[https://perma.cc/BSJ3-SCBZ] (describing the growth of the BLM movement since
2012).
137. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded over
10,600 demonstration events across the United States between May 24 and August 22.
Over 10,100 of those were peaceful, and fewer than 570 involved demonstrators engaged in violence. Over eighty percent of these demonstrations were connected to the
BLM movement or to the COVID-19 pandemic. Demonstrations& Political Violence in
America: New
Data for Summer 2020, ACLED
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ACLED_
USDataReview_Sum2020_SeptWebPDFHiRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5EQ-ERLN].
138. 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 55, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021). See State v. Gresham, No. A151691, 2016 WL 7338718 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), for a similar Minnesota case.
139. Andrew Karpan, When Can a Juror Say Black Lives Matter?, LAw360 (Aug. 9,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1299398 [https://perma.cc/Q4D3-K54H].
Knowing Ms. Reed stated in her questionnaire that she supported the BLM movement,
the prosecutor asked her if she supported destroying property. The prosecutors noted
that Ms. Reed "rolled her eyes before telling them that she did not support destroying
property that was not her own." Id.; see also Abbie Vansickle, You Can Get Kicked out of
a Jury Pool for Supporting Black Lives Matter, MOTHER JONES (July 8, 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-j ustice/2020/07/you-can-get-kicked-out-of
-a-jury-pool-for-supporting-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/7EBP-V9DD]. Ms.
Reed stated: "I felt targeted .... It was a life-changing experience for me." Id. The California Court of Appeals has since reversed the conviction in that case on the grounds
that the trial court's BLM-related reasons for striking Ms. Reed as a juror were "plainly
tied to race." People v. Silas, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 55, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
140. Brief for Amici Curiae Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center & ACLU
et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellants, People v. Silas, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48 ( Cal. Ct.
App. 2021).
141. See Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 595 (Colo. 1998) for an example of a court
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some to view BLM-related questioning as tantamount to "interrogating a juror's ... Blackness."1 42
Some courts have permitted jury selection questions related to
citizens' participation in, and attitudes toward, protests and protesters.1 43 As both lines of questioning suggest, the anti-discrimination
norms articulated in 1986 by Batson v. Kentucky1 44 have seen little
meaningful adherence as cause challenges are exercised. Instead, "justifications" used to strike Black prospective jurors for familiarity with
or participation in social justice efforts permeate the jury selection

process even beyond the poorly regulated exercise of peremptory
strikes.145
2.

Personal Contact with the Legal System

Today, seventy-seven million Americans, roughly one third of the
country's adult population, have a criminal record.1 46 In twenty-seven
states, and in federal court, a felony conviction will render a person

chastising a prosecutor's questioning of prospective jurors regarding race, when the
case did not have any "apparent racial issues." This is potentially problematic since
racial issues are often under the surface and influence perceptions of non-white defendants.
142. Karpan, supra note 139.
143. Juror Questionnaire, https://jurylaw.typepad.com/peppersprayproposed_
questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF4N-944R]; see also Maxine Bernstein, Trial
over Police Pepper Spray Reveals Challenge of Picking a FederalJury During Pandemic
and Protests in Portland, OREGONIAN
(Oct.
6,
2020),
https://www
.oregonlive.com/crime/2020/10/trial-over-police-pepper-spray-reveals-challenge
-of-picking-a-federal-jury-during-pandemic-and-protests-in-downtown-portland
.html [https://perma.cc/W5DF-ZNTD] (reporting that a U.S. district court judge asked
jurors if "[a] nything about recent protests would cause [them] not to be neutral in this
case," to which one prospective juror responded: "I don't like the way things have been
handled in Portland.").
144. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (articulating a stern adherence to the long-existing notion
that race-based preemptory challenges in jury selection are unconstitutional).
145. When a researcher conducted a study that
QUOTElooked at more than 700 cases in California, she found that peremptory challenges had been used to eject Black jurors more than 70% of the time. In her opinion,
the Batson process isn't working on the state level. Out of 142 Batson objections that
the state's high court had ruled on between 1989 and 2019, her report found that the
state's appeals court had found prosecutorial prejudice in only three."ENDQUOTE
Karpan, supra note 139.
146. Chidi Umez & Rebecca Pirius, Barriersto Work: People with CriminalRecords,
NCSL (July 17, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/barriers-to-work-individuals-with-criminal-records.aspx [https://perma.cc/SB6P-2CJF].
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permanently ineligible for jury service.1 47 Other states, including Illinois and Iowa, allow judges to remove jurors with felony convictions
from jury pools using a cause challenge.1 48 Aside from receiving a
summons for jury service, most jurors' contact with the legal system
will take the form of a misdemeanor-in 2015 alone, an estimated
thirteen million misdemeanor charges were filed.1 49 This means that
a citizen is as likely to face a misdemeanor charge as he or she is to
attend a four-year college or seek treatment from a doctor for the
flu.1 50 Like access to education and healthcare in this country, however, the effects and impact of the misdemeanor system are highly correlated with class and race.151 Some of the most prevalent charges, including for marijuana possession15 2 and driving with a suspended
driver's license,15 3 disparately target people of color and those who
cannot afford to pay fines. Those arrested for misdemeanor offenses
are also disproportionately poor.15 4 What this means, in practice, is

that only between ten and thirteen percent of those required to post
bail at arraignment can afford to do so.155 Black citizens are thus more

147. Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming are among the states that render those
convicted of felonies ineligible to serve as jurors for life. Ginger Jackson-Gleich, Rigging
the Jury: How Each State Reduced Jury Diversity by Excluding People with CriminalRecords, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
juryexclusion.html [https://perma.cc/JM4Y-A3YB]; see Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of
FelonsfromJury Services, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 150-57 (2003) (cataloguing laws in each
state nearly twenty years ago); see also Erik Ortiz, Most FormerFelons in CaliforniaAre
Now Eligible for a New Role: Jury Duty, NBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/most-former-felons-california-are-now
-eligible-new-role-jury-n1108726 [https://perma.cc/DL32-AHUL].
148. Kalt, supra note 147, at 152; see also Binnall, supra note 3, at 4 fig.1.
149.

ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 41 (2018).

150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 51-53; see also ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL

COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 1 (2018) (noting

that residents of low-income neighborhoods have "frequent encounters with law enforcement for low-level offenses that result in tickets, summonses, or arrests").
152. Drug War Statistics, DRUG POL'Y ALL., https://www.drugpolicy.org/
issues/drug-war-statistics [https://perma.cc/7AZ5-6AMD] (noting that over 350,000
people were arrested in 2019 for possessing marijuana).
153. NATAPOFF, supra note 149, at 50.
154. Id. at 53.
155. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 151, at 135 (citing Annual Report 2014, N.Y.C.
CRIM. JUST. AGENCY (Apr. 2016), https://www.nycja.org/publications/cja-annual
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likely to face arrest for misdemeanors. In New York City in 2015, for
example, forty-six percent of arrestees were Black-a figure that reflects higher levels of policing in predominantly low-income and minority neighborhoods.1 56
The frequent and unequal impact of low-level criminal charges
on ordinary people's lives led sociolegal scholar Issa Kohler-Hoffman
to characterize the misdemeanor legal process as a form of social control.1 57 Though the subjects of this process may never be incarcerated,
many are forced to confront the "procedural hassle" and degradation
associated with an arrest, police custody, court appearances, and the
strain of these encounters on one's employment prospects.1 58 Misde-

meanor convictions, as a result, have a significant and lasting imprint
on a person's life. This can include long-term debt and other financial
pressures caused by unpaid tickets, fines, or other processing fees.1 59
Then, of course, there is the impact of a criminal record on a person's
access to public benefits including low-income housing and food
stamps.

Unsurprisingly, those charged with minor offenses exhibit
greater skepticism toward the government.1 60 In her study of America's misdemeanor system, Alexandra Natapoff noted this skepticism
-report-2014 [https://perma.cc/7AZ5-6AMD] (noting some defense attorneys' mantra that "bail means jail")); Jamie Fellner, The Price of Freedom: Bailand PretrialDetention of Low Income Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUM. RTS. WATCH 13,22 (Dec.
2, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usl2l0webwcover_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PLX-DKHK].
156. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 151, at 51, 97 ("Certain individuals, namely,
young men of color, tend to have many police contacts over short periods because,
among other reasons, these policing tactics are highly spatially concentrated."). Relatedly, it is estimated that by the age of twenty-three, fifty percent of Black men in the
United States will have faced arrest. NATAPOFF, supra note 149, at 62 (citing Table 29:
Estimated Number of Arrests, FBI UNIF. CRIME REPORTING (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-29
[https://perma.cc/
65K5-9GVC]).
157. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 151, at 10 ("The most common penal outcomes
experienced by misdemeanor defendants are not removal to total institutions or the
burden of a permanently spoiled identity. Rather, they involve a set of ongoing entanglements with and obligations to various organs of the criminal justice system-from
police to courts to private social service providers-and result in people cycling in and
out of various legal statuses over time, often based on how they perform under these
obligations.").
158. Id. at 80.
159. Id. at 1.
160. See William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing
in Black and White: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Role of Jurors'Race and Jury Racial
Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 180-81 (2001) ("[R]are is the African-American
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in the reflections of her research participants, who expressed frustration and disappointment in a government with which they only had
negative encounters.161 Indeed, as Natapoff observed, "[t]he petty-offense process teaches this cynical, destructive lesson in civics to 13
million Americans each year."1 62 The jury system, which summons
nearly thirty-two million prospective jurors to court annually,1 63 has
the potential to impart a more hopeful message, premised on democratic representation in the legal system. Yet it does not do so in practice. One reason is the acceptability of the biased hunt for bias among
prospective jurors.
B.

FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS

This Section examines the issues posed by prospective jurors

who view law enforcement agents positively. These perceptions are
often shaped by personal contact or media consumption. For attorneys, this makes them a risk. On the one hand, unwavering support
for, and trust in, law enforcement may be deemed a source of bias that
justifies a person's removal from the jury pool. On the other, if the favorable view of law enforcement is derived from television or movies,
jurors may be subject to the "CSI Effect," and have a skewed or entirely
erroneous understanding of what evidence means and what it actually
shows.
1.

Police Allegiance

During jury selection, attorneys typically look to determine
whether prospective jurors believe that law enforcement agents are
more or less credible than other witnesses.1 64 Attorneys thus regularly ask prospective jurors about their views of police officers and

who cannot relate a tale of having been stopped by police in an affluent neighborhood
or followed closely at the heels around a clothing store. As one black law professor
recently put it, 'If I'm dressed in a knit cap and hooded jacket, I'm probable cause."
(quoting Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister?RaceNeutrality and the Ideal of RepresentativeJuries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 333-50 (1994)).
161. NATAPOFF, supra note 149, at 37.
162. Id.
163. See Gregory E. Mize, Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, The State-ofthe-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report, NAT'L CTR. STATE
CTS. 13 (Apr. 2007), https://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/__data/assets/pdf-file/0016/
5623/soscompendiumfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFH4-VQ9A].
164. See United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 870-71 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing the district court's evaluation of the jury panel's attitude toward police officers,
including their aptitude for showing favoritism for or against the police during jury
deliberations).
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other law enforcement agents and government officials, seeking information on how these jurors might perceive witnesses who come from
these groups.1 65 Such jury selection questions often focus on a person's past contact with law enforcement agents and, relatedly, on their
impressions of those who work in such roles. An example of such a
question posed during jury selection might include the following, delivered by a judge:
I will be instructing the jury at the end of the trial [that] the testimony of the
law enforcement officer should be treated the same as the testimony of any
other witness and that the jury should not give either greater or lesser weight
to the testimony of a witness just because the witness is a law enforcement
officer. Do any of you have such strong feelings about law enforcement [or]
the police-either positive or negative-that you would have difficulty fol166
lowing that instruction?

Other versions of this question during jury selection emphasize the
importance of judging law enforcement and non-law enforcement witness credibility by the "same standards."167 In some cases, jurors are
invited to share whether they view law enforcement work as "difficult" or "important"-therebywarranting greater deference and respect.1 68 In other cases, prospective jurors' feelings toward government officials, more broadly, have been conflated with their attitudes

165. Cathy E. Bennett and colleagues list a number of possible questions that can
be directed toward a jury pool to elicit possible juror bias regarding law enforcement
officers. Bennett et al., supra note 97, at 670 ('All of the State's witnesses are either
police officers or employed by the police department or a police organization. What
are your feelings about that?' 'When you think about the police department in your
city, what's the first thing that comes into your mind?' 'What have you heard about
your local police department?''How reliable, do you feel, is a police officer's testimony?
Why?'... 'How often do you think police officers testify? Well, if I told you that not only
do they testify constantly, but that they also take courses in testifying in court, what
would you think? How do you think this will affect how a police officer appears in the
court and while testifying?''How reliable do you think a police officer's judgments and
observations are compared to yours?''What would you think or feel if you saw a police
officer avoid directly answering a question?"').
166. Sara Kropf, Why Judges Should Stop Asking Jurors About Police Officer Witnesses During Voir Dire, GRAND JURY TARGET (May 15, 2019), https://
grandjurytarget.com/2019/05/15/why-judges-should-stop-asking-jurors-about
-police-officer-witnesses-during-voir-dire [https://perma.cc/9BM8-K8L5].
167. Sample Juror Questionnaire, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2012/dpen0023.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU49-9MZM] (asking questions
regarding other experiences with law enforcement, including having friends or family
who work in law enforcement, having being been personally questioned by law enforcement agents, etc.)
168. See, e.g., JurorQuestionnaire, supra note 143.
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toward the police. 169 In each context, an empirically-unfounded picture of jurors' views can result.
After engaging in such questioning, judges and lawyers may refrain from asking follow-up questions that might clarify the context of
jurors' views.1 70 This can lead to the removal of jurors "for cause" who
might have explained that their personal feelings would not have detracted from their fair consideration of evidence.171 If a judge or attorney concludes that a juror's stated perception constitutes an "unequivocal belief' about a police officer's likelihood to tell the truth, this
imputation of juror bias-however inaccurate-will justify the juror's
dismissal.1 72 Modes of questioning prospective jurors that suggest a
"predisposition" to view witness credibility in a certain way can thus
facilitate the removal of jurors for cause.1 73 There is little to prevent
an attorney who merely suspects a prospective juror's bias, absent follow-up questioning, from exercising a peremptory strike to dismiss
such a person.1 74 Toward deploying both types of jury strikes, judges
169. United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 755 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting a trial
court's jury instruction with approval).
170. Todd Oppenheim, Too 'Woke' for the Jury Box, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 2,
2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/02/too-woke-for-the-jury-box
[https://perma.cc/2LNF-4MZN].
171. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
172. Bennett et al., supra note 97, at 699. This concept is analogous to the "White
Coat Syndrome," where "jurors mechanistically defer[] to certain experts because of
their field of expertise." Neil Vidmar, Expert Evidence, the Adversary System, and the
Jury, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 137, 139 (2005) (quoting Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony
Champagne, Removing the Peoplefrom the Legal Process:The Rhetoric and Research on
JudicialSelection and Juries, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 242, 255 (1997)).
173. Bennett et al., supra note 97, at 699 (noting that "[s]uch a predisposition" on
the part of a prospective juror "prevents impartial judging of witnesses' credibility").
However, the trial court "has the discretion to determine whether such prejudice for
police officers exists." Id. The role of the judge in deterring attorneys from striking jurors through intentional-though at times relentless-rehabilitation can influence the
formation and composition of a jury. See, e.g., Hans & Jehle, supra note 97, at 1194
("Even when prospective jurors are able to recognize their biases and disclose them,
the judge may still elicit a false response that is more in line with the desirable answer.
If a judge asks if the prospective juror could be impartial and the prospective juror
replies no, the judge may continue that it is the juror's duty to follow the law and ask
the question again. Prospective jurors may give in to the pressure to comply and say
they can be impartial, even though their real feelings have not changed.").
174. Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers
Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 326 (2005) ("Even if this line of questioning does not convince a judge to excuse for cause, the series of voir dire questions provides important evidence for the attorney to use in considering the exercise of a peremptory strike.... Requesting an excusal for cause has to be considered in the totality
of the attorney's strategy: 'I don't challenge for cause unless I'm 99% sure that the
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and attorneys aim to gather information that might serve as a basis
for imputing attitudes toward law enforcement witnesses to the laypeople before them.1 75
2.

The "CSI Effect"

Jurors are often asked which television shows they watch.1 76 One
aim of such a question is to determine whether their understanding of
investigative and legal processes is gleaned from fictional dramassomething scholars call the "CSI Effect."1 77 Here, rudimentary-and
usually inaccurate-knowledge of evidence collection and law enforcement practices follows from consumption of popular television
shows.1 78 The CSI Effect presents a problem, as jurors are instructed
to rely on the evidence and information presented within the context
of a trial, rather than anything learned from engagement with external
judge is going to grant it. Because then I've got to use a peremptory. I can't let the juror
sit after he knows I tried to excuse him because there might be some animosity."' (citation omitted)); Thomas G. Hooper, Note, United States v. Lancaster: The Fourth Circuit Reverses Course on Jury Voir Dire in "SwearingContest" Cases, 76 N.C. L. REV. 233,
235 (1997) (describing defense attorney strategy).
175. See Hooper, supra note 174, at 235 ("In a criminal case in which jurors are
likely to decide the defendant's guilt or innocence based upon whether they believe
the testimony of the defendant or the testimony of a police officer, the defendant would
obviously benefit from knowing whether a juror believes that police officers are automatically due more credibility than other witnesses.").
176. Tamara F. Lawson, Before the Verdict and Beyond the Verdict: The CSI Infection
Within Modern CriminalJuryTrials, 41 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 119, 145-46 (2009) (noting that
judges often lead the questioning of jurors in federal court).
177. This is a modern equivalent to the "Perry Mason Syndrome" from the 1960s,
where, in response to the television show, juries waited expectantly for "defense attorneys to coerce an admission from the prosecution's star witness upon cross-examination," and believed that lawyers' failure to meet such expectations meant that he or she
had done "something wrong." Michael Mann, The "CSI Effect": Better Jurors Through
Television and Science?, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 211, 213-14, 220-22 (2006).
178. See Caroline L. Kinsey, CSI: From the Television to the Courtroom, 11 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 313, 313 (2012). Contra Wyatt Feeler, Can Fiction Impede Conviction? Addressing Claims of a "CSI Effect" in the Criminal Courtroom, 83 Miss. L.J. 1, 12 (2014)
(noting that several studies cast doubt on the existence of the effect); Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg Barak, A Study ofJurorExpectationsand Demands Concerning
Scientific Evidence: Does the "CSI Effect" Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 367 (2006)
(describing the results of study that showed that "specifically watching CSI or a similar
show did not have a causative impact on juror demands for scientific evidence as a
condition of a guilty verdict in most criminal case scenarios"). While I am going to discuss the concept based on this more generic definition, Edward J. Imwinkelried has
identified other definitions of the term. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Dealing with Supposed
Jury Preconceptions about the Significance of the Lack of Evidence: The Difference Between the Perspective of the Policymaker and That of the Advocate, 27 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 37, 38 (2010).
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media.1 79
One of the premises of a television show like CSI, for example, is
the idea that "people lie, but science always tells the truth."1 80 After
encountering various storylines in which forensic tests and techniques perfectly identify suspects,181 jurors may bring unrealistically
high expectations to the capacities of crime scene investigators, laboratory technicians, and prosecutors who appear at trial. When, invariably, the colloquially understood "science" of a case is not relied upon
as a primary source of evidence for a variety of reasons (perhaps because it is not plausible "outside of Hollywood"1 82 or because the police department cannot afford certain technologies),1 83 jurors may
question the reliability of law enforcement work and bring unfounded
sources of doubt to their deliberations.1 84 Alternatively, if the evidence produced at trial resembles that which is commonly used in a
179. Lawson, supra note 176, at 149 (including "knowledge learned from television, newspapers, independent investigations, or other unauthorized sources").
180. Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects: Media, Juries, and the
Burden of Proof, 41 NEw ENG. L. REV. 435, 441 (2007); Kinsey, supra note 178, at 319
("CSI raises the stature of scientific evidence to virtual infallibility by manipulating
viewers into believing forensic science is impenetrable and far more effective and accurate than it really is."). This belief forms the basis of one of the questions asked by
judges to discern biases on this topic. See Lawson, supra note 176, at 146 (reporting
Federal District Court Judge Marcia Cooke's experience of asking jurors, among other
questions, if they realize that many of the "scientific" measures used in CSI and similar
shows do not exist).
181. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and
Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1065 (2006) ("The popularity of CSI
lies in its ability to simplify the messy uncertainties of real-world crime. CSI's plots are
consistent with the strong psychological need to achieve closure following the commission of a crime.").
182. Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou, She Blinded Me with Science: Wrongful Convictions and the "Reverse CSI-Effect," 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 481,481-82 (2011); Kinsey,
supra note 178, at 322 ("Due to the inaccuracies of forensic evidence and as a result of
the cultivation theory, CSI viewers may believe it is possible to use an exit wound to
make a mold of a weapon, detect a lie by the shift of someone's eye, or predict the time
of an individual's death by evaluating the rate at which a segment of metal may rust,
when in reality these mechanisms do not exist in real life, and if found to exist, would
unlikely pass muster under the Daubert or Frye tests for courtroom admissibility of
scientific evidence.").
183. Donald E. Shelton,Juror Expectationsfor Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:
Perceptionsand Reality About the "CSI Effect" Myth, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 31 (2010)
(citing Shelton et al., supra note 178, at 28) ("The Wayne County jurors, in large part,
were of the belief that their local police departments had technologies that would allow them to perform fingerprint, ballistics, hair and fiber, and DNA analysis. The data
reveals that jurors typically expect some form of technology in all criminal cases.").
184. Kinsey, supra note 178, at 319 (citing N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The
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television show, jurors may accept scientific conclusions without appropriate scrutiny.185
Because jurors are more likely to view evidentiary practices they

have seen on television as accurate and relevant,1 86 attorneys and
judges see value in identifying prospective jurors whose responses
suggest they may reach conclusions based upon the "CSI Effect." Attorneys may also draw attention to jurors' television preferences1 87 to
reinforce the importance of distinguishing fictionalized cases from
those presented in court.1 88 This approach, when used, may have the
advantage of reinforcing preferred modes of evidentiary assessment
while rehabilitating jurors perceived to harbor biases that would warrant excusal for cause. In short, while positive-and unrealisticviews of law enforcement can pose their own challenges, lawyers appear more confident that these can be overcome by drawing a distinction between the fact and fiction of investigative technique.

CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Science Affects the Public's Expectations About
Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS 357,358 (2007)); see also id. at 323 (describing a
case in which the defendant was acquitted and the jury foreman, when interviewed
after the trial, "informed prosecutors he watched CSI and believed investigators should
have conducted 'extensive fingerprinting, DNA testing, and other forensics, and that he
did not think the prosecutors did enough."' (quoting Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect:
Fact or Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 70, 71 (2006))).
185. Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou refer to this concept as the "Reverse CSI Effect."
Godsey &Alou, supra note 182, at 483-84; see also Kinsey, supra note 178, at 319, 32122 (discussing "cultivation theory" which posits that 'heavy, long-term exposure' to
recurrent messages alters the reality of frequent television views, and they begin to
'perceive the real world as resembling what they see on television, and adopt attitudes
conforming to that visage." (quoting Kimberlianne Podlas, The "CSI Effect" and Other
Forensic Fictions, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 87, 98 (2007))). The "White Coat Syndrome,"
mentioned briefly above, is related to this type of tacit acceptance of scientific
knowledge. See Vidmar, supra note 172.
186. Kinsey, supra note 178, at 322 (quoting Jeffrey Heinrick, Everyone's an Expert:
The CSI Effect's Negative Impact on Juries,TRIPLE HELIX, Fall 2006, at 59).
187. Contra Feeler, supra note 178, at 4 ("Mentioning these shows may suggest to
jurors that they have unrealistic expectations for evidence, when in fact they may
not."); id. at 43 ("As with telling jurors that the government has no duty to conduct
scientific tests, telling them that 'the real world is not like CSI' is an open invitation to
jurors to give the government a pass on missing scientific evidence.").
188. THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES 300 (Dolores Albarracin, Blair T. Johnson & Mark
P. Zanna eds., 2005) ("[T]he effects of viewing frequency [of television shows] on people's beliefs can be reduced or eliminated by calling their television watching habits to
their attention[.]").
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III. THE NEED FOR A CHARACTER PROPENSITY OBJECTION
DURING JURY SELECTION
As discussed in the last Part, the Federal Rules prevent jurors
from hearing most character evidence due to the prejudicial conclusions they might draw about a witness's propensity to act in a manner
that is consistent with past behavior-particularly if that witness is a
criminal defendant. Yet during jury selection, there is no bar to juror
assessments that hinge on the same objectionable line of reasoning. A
lawyer's exercise of peremptory strikes may be viewed, to this end, as
a quintessential example of the deliberate reliance on what is otherwise prohibited reasoning.1 89
The only safeguard to the prejudicial or otherwise unsubstantiated character judgment of jurors is the Batson challenge. But this
comes late in the jury selection process and is aimed exclusively at
combatting lawyers' use of peremptory strikes to remove jurors based
on race, sex, and other protected characteristics.1 90 Current anti-discrimination law is thus underinclusive both in the form of juror questioning it authorizes, and in its presumption that judges do not sanction exclusion during the cause challenge phase of proceedings. Cause
challenge questioning in particular, which this Part will consider in
addition to peremptory strikes, is overseen by judges and overwhelmingly informed by appraisals of character despite the scanty information typically elicited from prospective jurors.

As it stands, a narrow set of trial objections are available to lawyers with concerns about jury exclusion. These include challenges to
questions posed to prospective jurors on the grounds that such questions misstate the law,191 are excessively intrusive or embarrassing,1 92
or compel jurors to commit to reaching verdicts on the basis of hypothetical scenarios.1 93 Lawyers may also recommend that prospective

189. See generally Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Courtand theJury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 167 (1989)
(discussing the historical breadth of rationales supporting the exercise of peremptory
strikes).
190. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
191. See, e.g., Goldman v. Ridenour, 383 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Mo. 1964).
192. Davis v. State, 633 A.2d 867, 871 n.1 (Md. 1992) ("Under common law rules
of voir dire, jurors need not answer any questions likely to humiliate or embarrass
them. The determination of which questions needed to be answered, however, rested
within the trial judge's discretion." (citing J. Alexander Tanford, An Introductionto Trial
Law, 51 MO. L. REV. 627, 638-39 (1986))).
193. See, e.g., State v. Moeller, 616 N.W.2d 424,442 (N.D. 2000).
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jurors be excused for cause,1 94 dismissed using an allotted number of
peremptory strikes,19 5 or make fair cross-section objections to the
constitution of a jury pool.1 96 Finally, a lawyer may object to the com-

position of a jury at the conclusion of the jury selection process.1 97
A majority of the trial objections lawyers utilize during the jury
selection process concern biased behavior that may be elicited or reinforced among prospective jurors through questioning. With the narrow exception of Batson challenges which lawyers can raise in response to an adversary's discriminatory use of a peremptory strike,

few trial objections seek to regulate the prejudicial assumptions that
can underlie the questioning of jurors. Addressing this gap, this Part
proposes a remedy for juror discrimination1 98 in the context of both
cause challenges and peremptory strikes:1 99 the application of a Rule
404 trial objection aimed at keeping character judgment out of decisions to dismiss jurors for cause.
Batson challenges seek to deter and correct for the prejudicial use
of peremptory strikes. By contrast, a Rule 404 objection available during jury selection would target a judge's reliance on character inferences about jurors as the basis of a cause challenge. In this regard, it
would draw on the Federal Rules' well-established recognition that
actions unrelated to the case at hand should not inform imputations
of bias. Moreover, in the interest of maintaining fair procedures for
assessing and empaneling jurors throughout the jury selection process, the deployment of a Rule 404 could help facilitate Batson challenges. The objection would accomplish this by unearthing judges' and
lawyers' inaccurate and prejudicial conclusions about jurors during
the earlier cause challenge phase of voir dire. In this respect, the ob-

194. See, e.g., 47 AM. JUR. 2D JURY § 193 ("Challenges for cause are the means by
which partial or biased jurors should be eliminated ..... (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000))).
195. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
196. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (using the language of a fair
"cross-section" to strike down the jury selection method used in Louisiana).
197. See Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objectionsfrom Beginning to End: The Handbookfor
Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 243, 269 (2002).
198. While for the most part this Article focuses on race, these arguments may extend to sex and socioeconomic status, with some building analogies based on scholarly
work on rape trials. See infra text accompanying note 242, for example.
199. Thomas Ward Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, 72
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 14 (2019) (noting how Justice Thomas' dissent in Batson highlighted the way in which "Batson's narrow emphasis . . 'blinded the Court' to challenges for cause).
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jection would strengthen the deterrent effects of current anti-discrimination law governing jury selection20 0 by expanding its reach and impact on the composition of juries.

As a preliminary matter, it is critical to recognize that discriminatory practices during the cause challenge phase of jury selection complement the well-documented use of peremptory strikes to disproportionately remove Black jurors.2 0 ' Here, attorneys can circumvent

Batson's deterrent and remedial effects 20 2 by disingenuously arguing
that an irrelevant aspect of a juror's background or past should be
viewed as grounds for his or her dismissal. In the interest of seeking
justice 20 3 or zealously advocating for one's client, 204 attorneys can toe
the line of legality, finding surreptitious ways to circumvent rules
without recourse. As a result, the spirit of the anti-discrimination law
governing jury selection can be violated even if the letter of the law is
not.

The absence of an explicit character evidence "ban" during jury
selection proceedings means that attorneys can make spurious claims
about the supposed partiality or bad character of Black jurors based
200. See, e.g., Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 174 (describing prosecutors' reluctance to strike Black jurors due to concern that they would be perceived as racist and
subject to a Batson challenge); OFFIT, supra note 1, at 73 (describing the extent to which
the Batson doctrine influences prosecutors' efforts to empanel Blackjurors rather than
suffer the reputational harm associated with perceived bias or an adjudicated Batson
violation).
201. Deborah L. Rhode, Characterin CriminalJustice Proceedings: Rethinking Its
Role in Rules Governing Evidence, Punishment, Prosecutors, and Parole,45 AM. J. CRIM. L.
353, 394 (2019) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). Rule 404, of course,
is not without its own practical limitations, as it creates openings for character evidence to facilitate propensity inferences under certain circumstances. In practice, for
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) permits the admission of character evidence for uses that license creative lawyers to merely relabel such evidence as "intent"
or "identity"-perhaps with the knowledge that jurors will likely consider the evidence
for its prohibited purpose (making inferences based on character judgments). See FED.
R. EVID. 404(b) (2) ("[Character] evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident."); Morris, supra note 18, at 191 (arguing that in drug
trafficking crimes, courts often violate the propensity ban by allowing evidence of previous drug involvement to establish "plan, motive, or intent" in a drug offense even
though "the drug history is relevant only because it "prove[s] the character of' the accused); see also Chris Chambers Goodman, The Colorof Our Character:Confronting the
Racial Characterof Rule 404(b) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2 (2007).
202. Frampton, supra note 199, at 14-15.
203. K. Babe Howell, ProsecutorialDiscretionand the Duty to SeekJustice in an Overburdened CriminalJusticeSystem, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 286 (2014) ("It is equally
well known that the prosecutor's duty is to do justice, not to obtain convictions.").
204. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 2, 8-9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).
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on information provided during jury selection, such as residence in a
heavily policed neighborhood, rental (as opposed to ownership) of
one's home, or contention that white people receive preferential treatment under the law.2 0 5 As with Rule 404(b)(2) and the Batson workaround for peremptory strikes, no anti-discrimination laws currently
in place would be violated. The disparate impact of such questioning
demonstrates the clear need for a jury selection objection that can
promote representative juries. For these reasons, the jury system's in-

tegrity would be enhanced by the application of Rule 404 principles to
jury selection to prohibit cause challenges, and (later) peremptory
strikes, based solely on propensity inferences that use proxies for
race.
A.

CAUSE CHALLENGES REQUIRE REGULATION

Cause challenge determinations are rarely appealed, as the
standard of review is abuse of discretion.20 6 As a result, they are considered "[e]ffectively standardless, insulated from meaningful review,
and profoundly racially skewed."20 7 Because there is no procedural recourse for the misuse of a cause challenge, such as a Batson challenge
applied to an illegal peremptory strike, parties have little to guide
them in assessing such strikes beyond sometimes ambiguous statutory language. In practice, many jurors are removed based on an attorney or judge's belief (or tacit acceptance) that individuals could not
be unbiased due to their race or socioeconomic status.2 08
In addition to the potential for racial disparities, the lack of clear
and uniform regulation of cause challenges makes it difficult to determine what qualifies as "bias," which is one of the primary authorized
reasons to strike a juror for cause. Bias, in general terms, is understood to refer to a juror's inability to impartially participate in a
trial.20 9 Yet there is no principled way to establish when the partiality

205. Mason v. United States, 170 A.3d 182, 187 (D.C. App. 2017) ("[T]here is no
basis for an inference that potential jurors holding that belief are necessarily unable to
be impartial.").
206. Id.
207. Frampton, supra note 1, at 821.
208. See id. at 788 ("Our myopic focus on peremptory strikes, however, has led to
the neglect of an adjacent problem: equivalent racial disparities pervade the exercise
of challenges for cause."); see also Thomas Ward Frampton, TheJim CrowJury, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 1593, 1621 (2018) (detailing a dataset that shows that prosecutors were 3.24
times more likely to use challenges for cause on Black jurors than white jurors).
209. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 529-30 (3d ed. 2004).
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of a juror should disqualify her. 210 Explicit articulations of bias are also
extremely infrequent.211 Because impartiality can only be determined
through a subjective assessment of a juror's state of mind, similar to
the aforementioned difficulties introduced by employment discrimination claims, attorneys are often left to draw conclusions about juror
bias through character inferences based on racial stereotypes. 212
Research reveals another problem with the current regime: in
both the civil and criminal contexts, the limited scope of much jury selection questioning provides the court with inadequate information
from which to predict favorable or unfavorable juror behavior or perspectives. 213 Attorneys, as a result, must challenge jurors based on
data that is unlikely to reveal bias. In the absence of comprehensive
questioning and elaboration on the part of jurors, it is unsurprising
that an attorney's strike decisions may hinge on a person's appearance-or other aspects of demeanor-that can serve as proxies for
race. 214

Just as there is "no question that propensity would be an 'improper basis' for a defendant's conviction," 215 at trial, it is an improper
basis for a juror to be struck for cause during jury selection. Even if
attorneys do not make explicit pronouncements about juror character, Rule 404 implicitly acknowledges the prevalence of character
judgment throughout trial, suggesting that its regulation should implicate lay and professional legal actors alike. Such judgment calls, for
example, will undoubtedly stem from information about prospective
jurors' criminal records, and histories of arrest elicited by judges and

210. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) ("For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula."
(quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936))).
211. Frampton, supra note 1, at 824.
212. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
213. John Campbell, Jessica Salerno, Hannah Phalen, Samantha Bean, Valerie Hans,
Less Ross & Daphna Spivack, An Empirical Examination of Civil Voir Dire: Implications
for Meeting ConstitutionalGuaranteesandSuggested Best Practices1, 83 (Denver Legal
Stud., Research Paper No. 20-11, 2020) https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3584582
[https://perma.cc/8NYH-2WBF] ("[T]he limited voir dire used in many courts does almost nothing to predict jury behavior, nor does it provide information to the court or
the parties about which jurors can/should remain.").
214. For an analogous discussion of some of the consequences of reliance on demeanor evidence, in the context of jurors' assessments of witnesses, see generally Julia
Simon-Kerr, Unmasking Demeanor, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 158 (2020).
215. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182 (1997).
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lawyers. 21 6 When attorneys rely on stereotypes to fill in gaps in jurors'
responses during jury selection, propensity inferences can be determinative of lawyers' empanelment decisions. 217
In the absence of protective evidentiary rules, such as applications of Rule 404 to defendants' past acts and the rape shield, 218 conventional jury selection practice will continue to both authorize and
facilitate anti-Black discrimination. To avoid this exclusionary outcome, Rule 404 should be extended to jury selection. As the next Section will demonstrate, sociolegal research provides a helpful framework, as well as empirically grounded rationales, for understanding
how courtroom practice both reflects and constitutes discrimination
in both the jury and legal system more broadly.
B.

CHARACTER JUDGMENT CONTRIBUTES TO JURY DISPARITIES

During jury selection, attorneys-or the judge, depending on the
jurisdiction and whether one is in state or federal court219-question
the jury pool with the goal of striking individuals who cannot fairly
and impartially consider evidence in the case before them. 220 A lawyer's use of propensity evidence to strike prospective jurors, however,

is not always scrutinized for its relevance or veracity. Inquiries into a
juror's attitude toward law enforcement agents, media consumption,
and acknowledgment of their own explicit biases have become so
commonplace they often appear on juror questionnaires. 22 1
216. See generally Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How StrikingJurorsBased on
Arrest Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 387 (2017) (discussing the extent to which juror arrest records serve as a proxy for racial exclusion during jury selection and proposing corrective procedural reform); cf Goodman, supra note 201, at
2 (summarizing how admitting character evidence with racial connotations under
Rule 404(b) leads to injustice).
217. The cause challenge itself implies the attorney's lack of confidence in that juror to remain openminded and unbiased in the trial (based on the potential juror's
responses to questions that had racial implications); cf Goodman, supra note 201, at 5,
11, 20 (describing a powerful combination of prior bad act evidence and racial stereotypes, which can influence jurors).
218. Matoesian, supra note 78, at 669.
219. See Gregory E. Mize & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Building a Better Voir Dire
Process, JUDGES' J., Winter 2008, at 4, 6 tbl.1.
220. See Barbara O'Brien, Catherine M. Grosso & Abijah P. Taylor, Examining Jurors: Applying ConversationAnalysis to Voir Dire in Capital Cases, A First Look, 107 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 687, 689 (2017).
221. See, e.g., Juror Questionnairefor Criminal Cases: Form JURY-002, JUD. COUNCIL
OF CAL. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/juryO02.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JKF9-KWER]; Recommended Uniform Juror Questionnaire:Sample Form 56,
ALA. JUD. SYS. (Jan. 10, 2001), https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/
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Nonetheless, while voir dire strategy may involve seemingly innocuous assessments of laypeople, 222 the selective emphasis on, and
interpretation of, particular characteristics can result in the disparate
empanelment of white and more affluent jurors. To the extent that
cause challenges rely on empirically unfounded 223 assumptions about
jurors' dispositions, they function as an end-run around anti-discrimination law meant to deter jury exclusion. 224
As we have seen, jurors are susceptible to dismissal for simply
acknowledging the empirical reality of racism in the legal system. 225
Yet cause challenges, unlike peremptory strikes, have been relatively
understudied in legal scholarship 226 despite the fact that they often
initiate the process of skewing the racial makeup of a jury pool. 227
Some background here is instructive. Cause challenges involve "instances in which threats to impartiality are admitted or presumed
from the relationships, pecuniary interests, or clear biases of a prospective juror." 228 Notably, cause challenges are unlimited and subject
to approval by the court.229 Attorneys who wish to propose a cause

crsam56.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BB4-253L]; Jury Qualification Questionnaire, LAKE
CNTY., OH. COMMON PLEAS CT.-GEN. DIV. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.lakecountyohio
.gov/common-pleas/document/jury-qualification-questionnaire
[https://perma.cc/
9UN7-PH9B].
222. Hans & Jehle, supra note 97, at 1179 (noting that attorneys have relied on demographic characteristics and stereotypes in jury selection that are "only slightly less
preposterous than the avoidance of bald men and people with green socks").
223. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 10 (1997) ("The research on the effects of
juror differences suggests that the fears are largely exaggerated."); see also Barbara
Allen Babcock, Jury Service and Community Representation, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 460, 463 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) ("The fifty-year-old black janitor
[she] struck from the jury that would have tried [her] twenty-year-old African American client for armed robbery might indeed have resented him. But he might also have
seen himself or his son or the whole suffering race and felt the deepest empathy for
the accused. Similarly, the prosecutors who dismissed African American women might
have mistakenly deprived the People's jury of stern protectors of law and order.").
224. See Saks, supra note 223, at 49 ("[I]t will be far easier to improve the performance of juries by making their task more manageable for them than by trying somehow to change the people who serve as jurors.").
225. See sources cited supra note 221.
226. Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias:Juror Confidence and
JudicialRulings on Challengesfor Cause, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513, 542 (2008).
227. Frampton, supra note 1, at 801 ("At the end of voir dire, with over 100 jurors
removed for cause, 45 jurors advanced to the peremptory-strike stage: 35 were white
(78%) and only 10 were black (22%). Thus, before peremptory strikes began, challenges for cause had already eliminated most black prospective jurors from the pool.").
228. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981).
229. Frampton, supra note 1, at 788.
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challenge must articulate a specific reason (some sort of identified actual or implied bias) for the strike. 230 Because the rationales supporting cause challenges must be presented to the judge, some contend
that they carry less risk of masking bias than peremptory strikes. 231 In
practice, this means that an attorney or judge's rationalizations for
such challenges have more creatively denied-or concealed-the
proxies for race on which they may be based.
Theoretically, at least, the available reasons that an attorney may
challenge a juror for cause are always "narrowly specified"-though
they vary by jurisdiction. 232 The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, for
example, delineate seven available reasons to challenge a juror for
cause. 233 The most pertinent to this discussion are "(6) Having formed
or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the
action"; and "(7) The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing
enmity against or bias to either party." 234 New York, in contrast, enumerates six reasons for which a cause challenge would be allowed, including the possibility that a prospective juror may have "(b) ... a state
of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial." 235 California has
only three available grounds for exercising a cause challenge: general

230. Lee Goldman, Toward a ColorblindJurySelection Process:Applying the "Batson
Function" to Peremptory Challenges in Civil Trials, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 147, 149
(1990).
231. Catherine Ross Dunham, Third Generation Discrimination:The Ripple Effects
of Gender Bias in the Workplace, 51 AKRON L. REV. 55, 86 (2017).
232. Frampton, supra note 1, at 788.
233. COLO. R. Civ. P. 47(e).
234. Id.; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-203 (West 2021) (containing a nearly identical code to Colorado's law); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16.10 (West 2021)
(same but providing a procedure to decipher whether "there is established in the mind
of the juror such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as would
influence the juror in finding a verdict"). But see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 797
(2021) (combining the two reasons listed above from Colorado into one by stating,
"[t]he juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality").
235. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 2021). The other acceptable reasons
relate to whether a person (1) does not have the qualifications to serve; (2) is related
or connected in some way to someone involved in the trial; (3) is currently testifying
or planning to testify as a witness in a previous hearing or proceeding in the trial; (4)
is serving on the grand jury that found the indictment for the case or served on a jury
previously for the same incident; or (5) would be uncomfortable recommending the
death penalty based on moral or other objections, if the charge is punishable by death.
Id.
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disqualification, implied bias, and actual bias. 236 Once an attorney suggests challenging a prospective juror for cause, the judge decides
whether to rehabilitate that juror through additional questioning. 237
C.

PROPOSING A CHARACTER PROPENSITY BAN FOR JURY SELECTION

This Section outlines a proposed expansion of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) that would bring the rule into use during jury selection.
This expansion would allow attorneys to object to the judge or opposing counsel's reliance on character propensity information as the impetus for a bias-based cause challenge. In particular, this rule 404(a)based jury selection objection would help deter the exclusion of prospective jurors whose critical view of the legal system is based on direct experience of unjust treatment.
1.

The Mechanics of a Rule 404 Jury Selection Objection

A new Rule 404 trial objection during jury selection would provide lawyers with the opportunity to rehabilitate prospective jurors
for whom a cause challenge was proposed on the basis of presumed
bias. The objection would be triggered by a judge's conclusion that a
prospective juror warrants excusal for cause, but it would precede the
juror's actual dismissal from the courtroom. At this point, either party
could choose to raise a Rule 404 objection to the active cause challenge. This would precipitate a rehabilitative line of questioning of the
juror at sidebar.238

236. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 225(b)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2021). As a point of contrast,
Florida has twelve, including "The juror is a surety on defendant's bail bond in the
case." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.03 (West 2021).
237. Contra Mark W. Bennett, Getting Clamorous About the Silence Penalty, 103
IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3 (2018) ("Judicial rehabilitation of potential jurors is easy, but
unwise. No matter how biased a potential juror professes to be, virtually any judge,
even those of modest skill or less, can persuade (I think coerce) the juror into claiming
that they can now follow the law in the judge's instructions."); see also Montgomery v.
Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1991) ("[O]bjective bias renders a juror legally partial, despite his claim of impartiality.").
238. To avoid the possibility that differences in the framing or phrasing of lawyers'
questions might yield disparate responses by prospective jurors, these questions
would conform to a script. See Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, Lawyers and
Jurors:InterrogatingVoir DireStrategies by Analyzing Conversations,16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 515, 541 (2019); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (No. 17-9572) (during which Justice Kagan comments on prosecutors' practice of formulating leading questions-or tag questionsthat influence (if not dictate) prospective jurors' responses).
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At this juncture, the juror in question would be asked whether he
or she would "put aside opinions formed based on his or her life experiences or belief system[s]." 239 Upon this prospective juror's affirmative response, the judge would then ask whether he or she could "put
aside his or her preconceived notions about the case to be tried."240 If
the prospective juror agreed with this assertion, the cause challenge
would fail and voir dire would continue. Supporting a lawyer's ability
to interrogate the rationale behind a cause challenge before a judge's
ruling on such a challenge would serve as a meaningful check on otherwise unrestrained judicial discretion in this context. And a judge's
decision to dismiss a prospective juror who is committed to fairly and
impartially assessing evidence and following the law could open a
pathway to appeal.

This check on attorney bias during voir dire would reduce dependency on character propensity inferences during jury selection in

'

at least two critically important ways. First, drawing the distinction
between setting aside one's opinions and life experience, on the one
hand, and setting aside attitudes about a particularcase, on the other,
is an essential first step in preventing lawyers from allowing stereotypical thinking to orient their assessments of juror character. Relatedly, enabling prospective jurors to respond directly to follow-up
questions about presumed biases would at least authorize, if not empower, them to intervene directly to combat inaccurate or disingenuous efforts to disenfranchise them from jury participation.24
Second, if a judge concluded that a prospective juror should not
be excused for cause due to a particular opinion or experience, this
finding could prevent the challenging attorney from invoking this
opinion or experience when later making a peremptory strike. That is,
a juror successfully rehabilitated after facing a cause challenge that
hinged on a character stereotype could not be subject to a peremptory
strike based on that stereotype once it had been determined to be inaccurate. The integration of a Rule 404-based trial objection during
the cause challenge phase of jury selection would thus confer the secondary, and equally consequential, benefit of putting on record a
party's failed attempt to dismiss a prospective juror based on a mis-

characterization of that person.
239. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 116 N.E.3d 609, 615 (Mass. 2019).
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. See generally B. Michael Dann, "LearningLessons" and "SpeakingRights": Creating Educatedand DemocraticJuries,68 IND. LJ. 1229 (1993) for a relevant discussion
of framing a central goal of jury reform efforts as empowering lay decision-makers rather than conceiving of them as passive actors.
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The efficacy of this proposed trial objection for cause challenges
would hinge on an attorney's ability and willingness to identify ways
in which the jury selection process-and legal institutions more generally-tacitly reinforce historically racist associations with particular beliefs (e.g., skepticism toward law enforcement agents) and experiences (e.g., negative encounters with law enforcement agents). 242
Addressing jury exclusion in this manner would not involve directly
accusing a judge or attorney of engaging in prejudicial decision-making, as in the case of most Batson challenges. 243 This is an important
feature of such a reform, since explicit racial animus is not the sole
cause of systemically racist legal processes and outcomes. 244 Just as
sociolinguist Gregory M. Matoesian suggested that gender is created
in the context of patriarchally minded rape prosecutions, the jury selection process is an arena in which race is constructed within a
"moral order" 245 of white-centricity and the "epistemological practice
of the adversarial system of justice." 246
When searching for signs of discrimination, it would be important to consider the number, form, 247 or type of questions asked of
Black prospective jurors as compared to white jurors, as well as the
grounds for challenging Black prospective jurors as compared to
white jurors. 248 It is worth noting, in this vein, that the disparate ques-

242. Ideas analogized from Matoesian, supra note 78, at 682-83 ("[I]n the rape
trial the incipient sexual relationship and rules of behavior are not generic or structural standards governing the coequal sexual preferences of males and females. Rather, they represent what I refer to as the patriarchallogic of sexual rationality.... ").
243. Cf Washington State's new Batson regime prohibiting a party from exercising
a peremptory strike if an impartial objective party-who is presumed knowledgeable
about the workings of institutional and implicit racial bias-could conclude that race
or ethnicity was a factor in the strike. See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(f) ("For purposes of this
rule, an objective observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases,
in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.").
244.

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WEL-

FARE STATE 7 (1998) ("Racial bias in . . a race-laden policy need not be the result of
racism per se."). See also Matoesian, supra note 78, at 682-83 for a discussion of the
extent to which exclusionary outcomes may result from legal processes that appear
superficially agnostic to the racial identities of its participants.
245. Matoesian, supra note 78, at 696.
246. See id. at 694.
247. Frampton, supra note 1, at 806 ("Prosecutors thus ask leading questions of
black prospective jurors designed to elicit disqualifying responses, while largely ignoring white prospective jurors.").
248. See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(g).
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tioning of prospective jurors of color may itself be perceived and experienced as hostile or embarrassing to jurors 249-exposing them to
scrutiny about personal topics in a room full of strangers. 25 0 And questioning that probes contact with the legal system, like other sensitive
subjects that may be proxies for race, may be experienced as degrading. 25

The language of Rule 404 should serve only as a starting point for
thinking about how to combat propensity inferences. It is clear that
courts and attorneys require guidance on how to recognize and respond to discriminatory forms of judgment.25 2 This would include instruction on words, phrases, and even certain reactions by attorneys
that can have the cumulative effect of excluding certain people from
participating in the legal system as jurors, as well as elaboration of the
fact that race (and gender) are poor predictors of juror attitudes. 25 3
The ultimate aim of this proposed trial objection is to improve the inclusivity of the jury system for all eligible to participate in it.254 Promoting greater jury representativeness would both enhance the perceived legitimacy of the legal system by further incorporating
historically-suppressed voices and facilitate fairer case outcomes for
defendants. 25 5
As this proposed procedural reform would likely uncover proxies
for race that can trigger prejudicial propensity inferences, it would
also complement state court efforts to reform the Batson doctrine.
Washington State Courts' General Rule 37, discussed in the next Section, offers an instructive example of how a court has tried to identify
statements that can subject prospective jurors to disparate excusal in

249. Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distributionoflury Service, 39 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 601, 623 (2005) ("Jurors appearing for jury selection are indeed vulnerable, especially with respect to their personal privacy.").
250. Johnson, supra note 216, at 408.
251. Id.
252. Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:Harmless Error,Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 101 (1996) ("The court's pre-Batson
cases on grand and petit jury discrimination reflected a commitment to the view that
one might rationally glean some hint of a person's perspective from his or her race or
gender.").
253. Id. (noting that social characteristics including race and gender became "flatly
irrational predictors of juror perspective").
254. See Binnall, supra note 216, at 16-17 (arguing by analogy that jurors with felony records feel similarly to those who have been racially prejudiced).
255. Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 1503, 1523-26 (2015).
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the context of lawyers' use of peremptory strikes. 25 6 Limiting the subject matter of questions by steering clear of such proxies, I argue, can
prevent prospective jurors from facing trials of their own as a precursor to carrying out a civic duty. 257
2.

A Rule 404(a) Jury Selection Objection Would Strengthen the

Batson Doctrine

Though a Rule 404-based trial objection would not fundamentally change the discretionary nature of peremptory strikes, the rehabilitative questioning triggered by such an objection would enhance
Batson's deterrent effect. First, it would help judges adjudicate Batson
challenges by ruling out rationales for juror dismissals flatly contradicted by jurors themselves. In this manner, the reform would pave
the way for a more transparentapproach to the jury selection process

in general. A trial objection aimed at identifying and remediating stereotypical grounds for cause challenges would have the added and significant benefit of putting on record bases of juror assessment that are
objectionable under Batson. In this way, it would help address a
longstanding limitation of the Batson doctrine: reliance on pretextual
grounds for juror dismissal. 25 8
Concern about peremptory strike-based exclusion has already
begun to prompt state-level reform aimed at addressing the deficiencies of current anti-discrimination law. 25 9 A common critique of the
Batson doctrine, supported by empirical research, holds that disingenuous "race-neutral" rationales for peremptory strikes can circumvent

256. See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(h); cf Goodman, supra note 201, at 21; . Goodman
also proposed a "Racial Reference Exclusion Rule," which could also be used in jury
selection. Goodman, supra note 201, at 53. The rule "would give defense attorneys a
firm basis for objecting to the use of racial references and to the indirect use of racial
generalizations and stereotypes." This approach is similar to the Batson doctrine insofar as the prosecution has the chance to "make an offer of proof as to the permissible
non-racial inferences based upon the evidence" before the judge rules on it. Id. at 5354.
257. Even defendants accused of sex crimes do not risk having significant aspects
of their lives put on trial to the extent that prospective jurors of color with frequent
past law enforcement contact might, due to the far-reaching scope of questioning currently allowed. Karp, supra note 73, at 21-22 (speaking of defendants accused of sex
crimes, Karp writes "[t]hey do not indiscriminately admit evidence of all the bad things
the defendant may have done in the course of his life, but only admit evidence of criminal offenses of the same type as those with which he is formally charged").
258. See generally Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IowA L. REV. 1585 (2012).
259. See generally Illegal Racial Discrimination injury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (2010), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF6C-YD3M].
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the law's requirement that eligible jurors not face exclusion based on
race. 260 Since lawyers rarely concede that race or racial stereotypes
play a determinative role in their strike decisions, courts often fail to
identify or seek to remedy discriminatory strikes of otherwise eligible
jurors. 261
The Supreme Court of Washington sought to address this problem by reforming the grounds for assessing Batson challenges. In a
criminal case in which prosecutors used their last peremptory strike
to remove the sole Black juror on the panel, the court decided to accept the state's "race-neutral" reasons for exercising the strike on the
grounds that they did not reflect purposeful discrimination on the part
of the challenged lawyer. 262 But the case was reversed on appeal. As a
result, the Supreme Court adopted a new framework for assessing
peremptory strikes, supplanting inquiries into explicit racial animus

with an objective test that asked whether challenged strikes could be
viewed as discriminatory by a hypothetical outside observer. 263 This
new framework took the form of a new rule which, among its innovations, flagged certain rationales for the excusal of Black jurors as unacceptable for their historical association with racist stereotypes.
Among these now "presumptively invalid" grounds for striking Black
jurors was the identification of such jurors as:
(i) [H]aving prior contact with law enforcement officers; (ii) expressing a distrust of law enforcement or a belief that law enforcement officers engage in
racial profiling; (iii) having a close relationship with people who have been
stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime; (iv) living in a high-crime neighborhood; (v) having a child outside of marriage; (vi) receiving state benefits;
264
and (vii) not being a native English speaker.

260. See generally Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The
Overwhelming Importance of Race injury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina
Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2012).
261. Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More
than the UnapologeticallyBigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 1075, 1077-78 (2011) ("[B]efore a trial court can find a Batson violation it must
determine that an attorney has (1) exercised a racially motivated peremptory challenge and (2) lied to the court in an effort to justify the strike. The trial court must find
all of this based almost solely on the attorney's demeanor. Accordingly, trial courts
rightly hesitate to make damning findings Batson requires on such paltry evidence.
Add to this the fact that attorneys may not even be aware of the racial motivation for
their own strikes, as well as the administrative difficulty of remedying Batson violations, and it should come as no surprise that Batson, in application, is all form and little
substance.").
262. See State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 472 (Wash. 2018).
263. WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37.
264. Id. at 37(h).
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The rule also identified examples of juror conduct historically associated with jury exclusion in the state of Washington. 265 In addition,
the rule identified examples of courtroom conduct that attorneys
could once cite with impunity to make sweeping generalizations and
discriminatory conclusions about potential jurors: "sleeping, inattent[ion], or staring or failing to make eye contact; exhibit[ing] a problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor; or provid[ing] unintelligent or confused answers." 266 Building on Washington's new rule,
state courts in California, 267 Oregon, 268 and Connecticut 2 69 may soon
strengthen their own guidelines for Batson adjudication, targeting
practices that lead to the disparate excusal of Black jurors. Other jurisdictions may follow the lead of the Arizona Supreme Court by moving to eliminate peremptory strikes altogether beginning in 2022.270
In part, this new wave of jury reform reflects the growing recognition that lawyers draw on inferences that have nothing to do with
impartiality when evaluating and ultimately striking jurors. Currently,
evidentiary rules preclude jurors from considering character propensity, as it is widely understood that these considerations would lead
to problematic and dubious conclusions about witnesses' trustworthiness or a defendant's culpability. Meanwhile, lawyers are permitted to
probe a person's character and draw conclusions about their suitability for jury service that are no less unsound. Lawyers too are prone to

follow poorly-substantiated and prejudicial lines of reasoning. The application of Rule 404(a)'s character propensity ban within the context
of juror questioning and assessment is therefore congruent with contemporary reform efforts aimed at tackling the stereotypes that inform juror strike decisions.
CONCLUSION
To meaningfully address juror exclusion, the American legal
system must fully-and explicitly-reject the notion that a particular
"background characteristic" is determinative of a juror's perception of
265. Id. at 37(i).
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
268. See, e.g., State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7 (Or. App. 2019).
269 Report of the Jury Selection Task Force to Chief Justice Richard A. Robinson,
Conn. Jud. Branch 21-23 (Dec. 31, 2020), https://jud.ct.gov/Committees/
jury-taskforce/ReportJurySelectionTaskForce.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ7U-GTYH].
270. Arizona Bans Use of Peremptory Strikes in State Jury Trials, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug.
30,
2021),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/Arizona-bans-use-of
-peremptory-strikes-in-state-jury-trials [https://perma.cc/6RGU-J975 ].
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evidence in an unrelated case. 271 Much work remains to be done. In
courtrooms around the country, attorneys argue that prospective ju-

rors-many of whom are Black or poor-couldnot possibly remain impartial in a case due to past direct or second-hand contact with the
legal system. Such a propensity inference, which is largely permitted
in the contemporary court, relies on the same kind of inference that
the Federal Rules bar during witness testimony. That such rules
should hold for witnesses and defendants but not for prospective jurors is not only nonsensical but unjust. We can begin to address this
source of persistent exclusion in our legal system by extending the
current protections of Rule 404(a) to cover jury selection.
"The point here," Bennett Capers writes of our moment, "is not

just that this history is important. It is that we have not yet untethered
ourselves from history. Social science literature makes clear that race
is still a factor in credibility determinations." 272 To achieve meaningful
anti-discrimination reform, we cannot pretend that ours is a legal system of racial blindness. 273 Rather, we must acknowledge the continued use of stereotypes and other unjustified inferences, and address
the sites of legal practice where these stereotypes and inferences are
permitted to exclude people from the legal process. Reform itself can
also be a symbol of our continued commitment to justice. To legal actors and prospective jurors, we can affirm our belief in the dignity 274
and value of the public, and the importance of an inclusive legal system through the creation of a Rule 404(a) objection for use during jury
selection. Ultimately, we will not have a more representative legal system until we have a more reflexive one-and this means grasping that
a prospective juror can believe that the system is unjust and yet still
participate sincerely in the attempt to do justice through it.

271. Rose & Diamond, supra note 226, at 539.
272. Capers, supra note 62, at 889-90 (citing James W. Neuliep, Stephanie M. Hintz,
& James C. McCroskey, The Influence of Ethnocentrism in OrganizationalContexts: Perceptions of Interviewee and ManagerialAttractiveness, Credibility, and Effectiveness, 53
COMM. Q. 41, 52 (2005)).
273. Mikah K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward an Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom,2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1245 ("I believe that the first step
in ridding the jury system of racial bias is to tell the truth about the prevalence and
effect ofbias. This includes naming the stereotypes that are at play whenever a person
of color enters a courtroom.").
274. Leonard, supra note 47, at 841 ("Trials should seek both determination of
truth and protection of individual dignity.").

